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THE

POLITICKS

On BOTH SIDES,

With REGARD to

FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Stated from their own WRITINGS, and examined by the Courſe of EVENTS.

WITH

Some OBSERVATIONS on the

PRESENT STATE of AFFAIRS

IN

GREAT BRITAIN,

And the Effects of our NEGOTIATIONS, for ſeveral Years paſt.

Juxtâ ſe poſita magis eluceſcunt.

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THE

POLITICKS *on both Sides,*

With REGARD to

Foreign Affairs, *&c.*

" THE whole Face of Affairs in *Europe* is, within the Space of the laſt Year, ſo much alter'd, that it is almoſt impoſſible for the moſt unconcern'd Spectator to prevent his Thoughts from running out into Queſtions and " Suppoſitions about it. *Curioſity* it ſelf, the low- " eſt Principle of all our Enquiries, will force its " Way into ſuch a Scene; and will expect, or in- " vent, ſome Account of ſo ſurprizing a Change " from a CALM, hardly parallel'd by any PAST " PROSPECT, to a ſudden Gathering of CLOUDS; " which, if not ſoon diſſipated, muſt burſt and " diſcharge Themſelves ſomewhere or other.

" But when *Self-Intereſt* is join'd to this *natu-* " *ral Curioſity*, and it becomes a *perſonal* and *na-* " *tional Concern* to know the main Cauſes and " Springs of *ſuch Events*, as all are intereſted in; " there ſeems then to be a RIGHT, ſtrictly ſo cal-

" led, to demand and receive all the Satisfaction " the Nature of ſuch Affairs can permit to be " given. In a *free Nation* eſpecially, where no " Reſolutions can be effectual without the Con- " ſent and Support of the Community, every " Man, who can think at all, will think it an *in-* " *jurious Treatment*, if, at a proper Time and in " a proper Manner, *ſome Light be not held forth to* " *them*, and ſome ſatisfactory Solution given of " *ſuch Appearances*, as muſt otherwiſe very much " perplex and diſturb Him.

I chuſe to begin this Diſcourſe in the very ſame Words with the Author of the * ENQUIRY, about ſeven Years ago; not only becauſe the preſent State of Affairs in *Europe* ſeems to be as like the State of Affairs, at that Time, as two Conjunctures can poſſibly reſemble each other; but likewiſe for a Juſtification of the *preſent Enquiry*, to which I think myſelf equally intitled, though perhaps not ſo well inſtructed as *that Writer*; and " † every *Briton*, who, either by his Treaſure or " his Blood, by his Vote or his Intereſt, by his " Perſon or his Repreſentative, hath in Time paſt " borne any Part in procuring the *common Peace*, " and eſtabliſhing the ſeveral Intereſts of *Europe*; " every ſuch Member of the *Britiſh* Nation, who " by *this Time* flatter'd Himſelf with Hopes of " enjoying the Reſult of all his *Toil*, and *Taxes*, " and *Blood*, in an *univerſal Peace*, and an *extend-* " *ed, undiſturb'd Commerce*, hath a Right to ask " ——*How comes this Face of Things to be again* " *overclouded?*——*All* Europe *once more in Agi-* " *tation!*

It is not improbable that *Thoſe*, *† *in whoſe Time* of

* See *an Enquiry into the Reaſons of the Conduct of Great Britain*, &c. p. 3. † *Id.* p. 4. *† *Ib.*

of Power ſuch a Criſis *of political Affairs appears in the World*, may aſcribe it intirely to an Event, which no human Wiſdom could poſſibly foreſee; I mean the Death of the late King of *Poland*; but whether it is really owing to *that Incident*, or to ſome *other Cauſes* more remote, ſhall be the Buſineſs of our preſent Enquiry.

When I firſt took the Reſolution of writing upon this Subject, I propoſed, for the Sake of Impartiality, not only to ſtate the *Politicks on both Sides from their own Writings*, but to place their reſpective Arguments upon every material Topick of Debate, for ſeveral Years paſt, in oppoſite Columns, and in their own Words; with no farther Remarks upon them than what ſhould be juſt neceſſary to connect them together, and make them generally underſtood. This, no Doubt, would have been the moſt effectual Way to obviate the common Complaints againſt *political Writers*, and to purge myſelf from the Imputation of deſigning to miſrepreſent the Arguments on *either Side*, or to draw falſe Concluſions from them. But, upon Trial, I found the Reaſoning of *ſome Writers*, whom I am obliged to quote, ſo very diffus'd, and ſcatter'd up and down in ſeveral Parts of the *ſame Book*, or reiterated with frequent Variations in *others*, according to the different Circumſtances of Affairs; that I could not put my firſt Deſign in Execution, without ſwelling *this Treatiſe* to a much larger Bulk, than would be either proper, or agreeable upon ſuch an Occaſion. I was therefore obliged to take a ſhorter Method, by collecting their Senſe together, and reducing their Arguments, upon ſeveral Points, into Propoſitions, with marginal References to the *Writers* Themſelves. As I chuſe this Method for the Reader's Eaſe more

more than my own; ſo I aſſure the Publick that wherever I find myſelf under this Neceſſity of abridging the Arguments on *either Side*, I will do it with the utmoſt Exactneſs and Fidelity, as far as I underſtand them my ſelf; and though it may be ſoon perceived to *which Side* I am inclined, I ſhall ſcorn to attempt any mean Triumph over the *other*, or to impoſe on the World, by any wilful Miſrepreſentation; for I think it not only an unfair, but a moſt ridiculous Way of writing upon any diſputable, or diſputed Subject, to wreſt the Words of an *Adverſary*, or the Meaſures, upon which they are founded, to any Meaning, or Conſequences, which do not naturally reſult from them. Such Artifices as Theſe may impoſe upon Perſons, unacquainted with the Point in Debate, and ſerve the little Purpoſes of a *temporary Expedient*; but will always recoil at laſt upon *Thoſe*, who make uſe of them, and do moſt Hurt to *that Cauſe*, which they are calculated to promote.

This being premiſed, as the Rule of my own Conduct in the preſent Enquiry, I ſhall now proceed to a curſory View of the principal Tranſactions for ſeveral Years paſt, and the Sentiments of *both Parties* upon them, as they appear in their Writings; with ſome Obſervations on the Courſe of *Events*, as the ſureſt Guides to us for diſcovering the true Cauſes of the preſent Commotions in *Europe*.

It is acknowledged, on *both Sides*, that all our late *Negotiations* and *Expedients*, to preſerve the publick Tranquility, were occaſioned by the firſt Treaty of *Vienna* and the Counter-Allyance of *Hanover*, which ſucceeded it; for his late Majeſty was pleaſed to aſſure us from the Throne, in the Year 1724, *that We had Peace with* ALL POWERS *abroad*; but We had ſcarce Time to congratulate our

ourſelves on this happy Situation of Affairs, before the whole Scene was again embroiled, as the *Enquirer* moſt pathetically complains in the Paſſages before cited. The chief Point therefore in Diſpute at that Time was, to what Cauſes ſo ſudden and, as it was called, ſo *unaccountable a Conjunction* was really owing. The *Court-Writers*, as well as their *Patrons*, imputed it, in the moſt peremptory Manner, to the dangerous Deſigns of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, againſt the Liberties of *Europe* in general, as well as the moſt valuable Intereſts of *Great Britain* in particular. The *Writers on the other Side* ſeemed to look upon it only as a *defenſive Treaty* between two Nations, whoſe Intereſt it was to ally Themſelves to each other at that particular Juncture. This Point was fully canvaſs'd about Five Years ago, by * a Gentleman, who wrote under the Name of JOHN TROT, and the Author of the *Enquiry*; in the Courſe of which Debate, I think it was indubitably proved that the Proſpect of the *Infanta's* being ſent back from *France*, after the Duke of *Orleans*'s Death, induced the Court of *Spain* to begin a Negotiation with the *Emperor*; and that her being actually ſent back, with our *Refuſal of the ſole Mediation*, determined his *Catholick Majeſty* to put a finiſhing Hand to *that Treaty*. To This it was added that our Refuſal to reſtore *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, in Purſuance of a *Promiſe*, as They pretended, founded on a LETTER from his late Majeſty to the King of *Spain*, might be another Motive to ſuch a Reſolution at the Court of *Madrid*; for though the very Exiſtence of any *ſuch Letter* was at firſt ſtrenuouſly denied, a Copy of it hath been ſince produced

* See *Trot's ſecond Letter to the Craſtſman*, Vol. 4. p. 74. *Defence of the* Enquiry, *p.* 14. *John Trot's third Letter to the Craſtſman*, Vol. 4. p. 272.

duced in both Houſes of Parliament; and if it does not contain an *abſolute Promiſe*, yet it furniſhes Them with a Pretenſion, at leaſt, to found ſuch a Claim upon it. It was likewiſe ſuggeſted, not without ſome Grounds, that our concluding a *private Treaty* at *Madrid*, in the Year 1721, whilſt We were Mediators between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, gave ſuch an Umbrage at the Court of *Vienna* as help'd to pave the Way to a Reconciliation between *thoſe two Powers*; *one* of whom had received a very great Indignity from the Court of *France*, and the *other* not a little diſpleas'd with That of *Great Britain* upon the Account beforementioned. It deſerves a Remark in this Place, that *Spain* depended upon *France* as her Friend at the Congreſs, and the *Emperor* look'd upon *Great Britain* in the ſame Light; but *both Parties* being thus diſobliged by the *reſpective Mediators*, on whom They rely'd, it became almoſt neceſſary for the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* to contrive ſome Method of reconciling Themſelves. This ſeems, at leaſt, a plauſible Reaſon for * " two Powers, that could hardly be " kept within the Bounds of common Decency to- " wards one another, by all the Addreſs of *two* " *powerful Mediators* in a publick Treaty, abandon- " ing *that Mediation*; and, in the Middle of it, " privately running into one another's Arms with " all the Marks of cordial Affection and a reſo- " lute Friendſhip.

But whatever might be the true Grounds of this ſudden Revolution of Counſels and Diſpoſitions in the *two Courts*; it is certain that the Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Meaſures taken in Oppoſition to it, laid the Foundation of that long Series of Negotiations, Conventions, and Projects of Accom-

* *Enquiry*, p. 5.

commodation, which engroſs'd all our Attention for ſeveral Years together. Let us therefore review the Conduct of *both Parties*, upon this Occaſion.

Now, if the Treaty of *Vienna* contain'd nothing but an Accommodation of Differences between the *two Courts*, with the uſual Stipulations of *Peace*, *Commerce* and *mutual Defence*, (as the *contracting Parties* declared) We had no Occaſion to take ſuch an Alarm, or to be in ſuch an Hurry of putting our ſelves in a Poſture of Defence. We ought rather to have rejoiced that *theſe Powers* had found out a Method of adjuſting their own Differences, after We had attempted it in vain; ſince nothing elſe was wanting at that Time, as We have been often told, to compleat the general Repoſe and Tranquility of *Europe*. Nay, it would certainly have been our Intereſt, in ſuch a Caſe, to accede to *that Treaty*, as We were invited to do, inſtead of entertaining ſuch terrible Apprehenſions from it, and taking ſuch extraordinary Meaſures to defeat it.

But it muſt be confeſs'd, at the ſame Time, that if the Allies of *Vienna* had really entered into any ſuch dangerous Engagements as our *Politicians* apprehended, and their *Advocates* poſitively aſſerted, it was certainly their Duty to oppoſe them with the utmoſt Vigour.

For this Reaſon, the *Author of the Enquiry* made it his chief Buſineſs to prove that there was a *ſecret*, *offenſive Treaty* between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, beſides thoſe publick ones of *Peace* and *Commerce*, which They had communicated to the World. Nay, He pretended to be ſo well inform'd of *this Fact*, that He gave us the particular Articles of it; *viz.* " 1. * That the *Empe-*

* *Enquiry*, p. 34.

" *for* was to aſſiſt *Spain*, in obtaining *Gibraltar* by " Force. 2. That *Spain* was to ſupport the *Em-* " *peror*, in his new Eſtabliſhment of the *Oſtend* " *Company*; for both which Purpoſes, as He told " us, the Quota's of *Money* on one Side, and of " *Soldiers* on the other were actually ſettled. 3. " That the *two Courts* had undertaken to place " the *Pretender* on the Throne of *Great Britain*; " and to begin with that Enterprize, before They " proceeded to put their other Projects in Exe- " cution." Theſe were Points, which particularly affected *Great Britain*, in her tendereſt Concerns. But the *ſame Author* likewiſe diſcovered another Article in this *ſecret, offenſive Treaty*, which had the ſame bad Aſpect upon all *Europe*, and threatened Her with univerſal Monarchy; " * I mean, " *ſays He*, the Marriages of the two *Arch-Dutch-* " *eſſes*, Daughters to the preſent Emperor, with " the two *Infants of Spain*, Sons to the King by " the preſent Queen." *He then obſerves*, " that " ſuch an Alliance muſt conſtitute a Power in *one* " *Family* beyond all, that We have known, for- " midable and irreſiſtable." *In another Place*, *He leaves us to judge*, " † whether ever hitherto any " *one Scheme* hath appeared in *Europe*, of a De- " ſtruction ſo univerſal, and of a Ruin ſo extended, " as This appears plainly to be.

It was indeed alledged that even in the *publick Treaty* of *Vienna* greater Privileges in *Commerce* were granted to the *† *Emperor*'s Subjects than to Thoſe of *Great Britain*; but the Falſhood of this Aſſertion appeared very plainly from the *Treaty* itſelf, which puts Them only on the ſame Foot with the *moſt favoured Nations*; and *Great Britain* having long been in that Number, whatever Privileges

* *Enquiry*, p. 86. † *Ib.* p. 91.
*† *Enquiry*, p. 62.

vileges of *Trade* any other Nation may obtain from his *Catholick Majeſty*, muſt be conceded to *Us*, at the ſame Time, by Virtue of *former Treaties*. Beſides, the King of *Spain* immediately diſown'd any ſuch Deſign by his Miniſters, and afterwards in a formal Article of a Treaty; which is ſo remarkable that I cannot forbear quoting it.

" * *The Miniſters of his* Britannick *Majeſty*, and " of his *moſt Chriſtian Majeſty* having PRETENDED " that in the Treaties concluded at *Vienna* be- " tween the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*, in the " Year 1725, there were diverſe Clauſes, that in- " fringed the Articles of the ſeveral Treaties of " *Commerce*, or of the Treaties of *Peace*, in which " *Commerce* may be concerned, antecedent to the " Year 1725; his *Catholick Majeſty* hath declared, " as He declares by the preſent Article, that He " never MEANT to grant, nor will ſuffer to ſub- " ſiſt, by virtue of the ſaid Treaties of *Vienna*, " any Privilege contrary to the Treaties here above " confirmed.

It was likewiſe affirmed that the *Emperor*'s *Miniſter* had acknowledged ſome Engagement with *Spain*, relating to *Gibraltar*; but it appears from the † *Enquiry* itſelf that his *Imperial Majeſty* entered into this Engagement upon the Repreſentation of the Court of *Spain*, *that there remain'd ſtill ſome Things to regulate between his Catholick Majeſty and the King of Great Britain*; in which, it is probable that the Court of *Spain* might include the *famous Letter* of 1721, upon which They founded their Pretenſions and Demand of *Gibraltar*; but the *Emperor* would engage no farther than to employ his *Mediation* between Them, under theſe Reſtrictions; that the Points in Diſpute *had*

* See the Treaty of *Seville*, in the original *French*, Art 3
† *Ib.* p. 21.

any Relation to the Treaty of London, *or arose in Consequence of that Treaty*; nor even then, *unless it should prove agreeable to his* Britannick *Majesty*.—In another Part of the *same Book* it appears, * *that a* NOBLE PERSON *in an high Station having publickly declared it, in the* House of Lords, *as an undoubted Truth, that there was a* secret, offensive Alliance *between the* Emperor *and* Spain, *which contain'd Articles in it destructive to the Rights of* Britain, *both with Regard to its* Possessions *and its* Commerce *abroad*; *the* Imperial Resident *here was ordered to give Satisfaction to the* British *Court, upon this Subject, by producing the* Article, *which his Master had entered into, relating to* GIBRALTAR; and this Article imply'd no more than that his *Imperial Majesty* had engaged to use his *good Offices*, if it should be agreeable to his *Britannick Majesty*, as his *Minister* had before declared. But all these Assurances were far from giving our *Politicians*, or their Advocate the *Enquirer*, any Satisfaction that there was no *such Engagement*; though the Event hath sufficiently shew'd that the *Emperor* never gave his *Catholick Majesty* the least Assistance towards the Recovery of *that Place*, whilst it was besieg'd, nor at any other Time, during our long Misunderstanding with *those Courts*.

As for the OSTEND COMPANY, it was always treated as a Point of so little Consequence to our essential Interests, on † *one Side*; and hath since been declared so by the *† *other*; that I shall not detain the Reader with any particular Detail of the Controversies about it. But it may not be amiss just to take Notice, as We pass along, that *this Company*

* p. 35. † See the *Craftsman*, Vol. 1. p. 202.
*† See the *London Journal*, Dec. 21, 1728; or the *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 84.

Company hath accidentally proved of great Detriment to us, not only by contributing to the late Diſturbances in *Europe*, but likewiſe by putting all Countries upon Projects of the ſame Kind; and though his *Imperial Majeſty* hath at length conſented to the Abolition of the *Company* at *Oſtend*, He is far from having given up all Thoughts of the *Trade*, being now carrying on a Negotiation at *Lisbon* for that Purpoſe.

Let us therefore return to the *ſecret*, *offenſive Treaty*; by which the two Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, as the *Enquirer* aſſerted, had not only entered into the ſtrongeſt Engagements upon all *theſe Points*, but likewiſe to place the *Pretender* upon the Throne of *Great Britain*. This was, indeed, an alarming Conſideration, and what might juſtly provoke the Reſentments of a free People; eſpecially, when They were aſſured, in the moſt authoritative Manner, "that * the *Britiſh* Court "had poſitive Intelligence, and Intelligence from "more than one Perſon, and ſuch as could be in-"tirely depended on, that one expreſs Article of "*this Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain* con-"tain'd an Obligation in Favour of the PRETEN-"DER, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt "for Him in *England*, before opening the War "in any other Parts." — It is no Wonder, I ſay, that the Paſſions of the People were inflamed by ſuch Declarations as Theſe, and broke out into the warmeſt Addreſſes againſt *theſe Powers*, whom They ſuppoſed to be engaged in ſuch deſtructive Meaſures. Some of Them were ſo very zealous, upon this Occaſion, that They not only expreſs'd their chearful Acquieſcence under a Land-Tax of †*four Shillings in the Pound*, but made a voluntary Offer

* *Enquiry*, p. 52. † *Totneſs Addreſs*.

Offer of the *other ſixteen, and of every Thing elſe, that is dear and valuable to Them.*

Here likewiſe I muſt repeat my Acknowledgment, that if the Intelligence of *ſuch a Deſign* was well founded, our *Miniſters* were not only fully juſtify'd in all their Precautions to defeat it, but would have been juſtify'd in much farther Lengths than They thought fit to go. But when all this *poſitive Intelligence, convincing Evidence,* and *pretended Certainty* appeared to be founded only on * SUSPICIONS, *or ſomething more than* SUSPICIONS, *built upon* APPEARANCES; or at beſt, when the whole Evidence, as † *another Writer* ſums it up, conſiſted in nothing *but* Wharton's *Rambles,* Ripperda's *Chit-chat, Hearſays of what* one great Man *writ, concerning what* another great Man *ſaid, three* Muſcovite *Ships coming to* Spain, *Embarkations, which were never made, and Armies, which were never aſſembled*; when This, I ſay, appeared to be the Caſe, many Perſons were inclined to ſuſpend their Belief of any *ſuch Deſign,* till They ſaw it a little more authentically proved; eſpecially, ſince his *Imperial Majeſty* thought fit to diſown it by his *Miniſter* here, in the moſt ſolemn Manner; which He had no Occaſion to do, if He was really grown ſo inveterate againſt his *Britannick Majeſty,* as the *Court-Writers* repreſented Him. Nay, I have been informed, upon pretty good Authority, that long before Mr. *Palm's* Memorial, or the *Enquiry* was publiſhed, his *Imperial Majeſty* took an Opportunity of declaring, upon the Faith of a *Chriſtian* and the Word of an *Emperor,* that He was ſo far from having enter'd into any Meaſures for placing the *Pretender* on the *Britiſh* Throne, that no ſuch Overtures had been made to Him. If This ſhould be true, as I hope it is not,

* *Enquiry,* p. 33. † *Craftſman,* vol. 4. p. 257.

not, what ſhall We ſay to *thoſe Men*, who inflamed the Nation to ſuch an Height, upon this Account, and——Let Them read their own Article of Impeachment againſt the late Earl of *Oxford*, for *corrupting the Fountain of Truth, and putting Falſhoods into the Mouth of Majeſty.*

Her *Czariſh* Majeſty likewiſe purged Herſelf from the ſame Charge, by a ſolemn Declaration * that ſhe had never enter'd into any Engagements with the *Pretender* againſt his *Britannick Majeſty*, and that ſhe look'd upon all ſuch Reports as meer Calumnies ſpread abroad by the *Engliſh Miniſters*, in order to juſtify their Meaſures at home, and prejudice foreign Courts againſt Her.

The Gentlemen on the *Country Side* were therefore juſtify'd, as far as *Events* could juſtify them, in their Backwardneſs to believe any *ſuch Deſign*; for from that Time to This there hath not been any Attempt, nor any Appearance of an Attempt, in Favour of the *Pretender*. Nay, even the *Court-Writers* themſelves ſeem'd to be aſhamed of this Argument a Year or two after, when all their *poſitive* and *undoubted Intelligence* dwindled away to † APPREHENSIONS ONLY *that there might be Engagements, in Favour of the Pretender.* I believe They have ſince made a Diſcovery that even their *Apprehenſions* were groundleſs, and that there never were any *ſuch Engagements*, either *oſtenſible*, or *non-oſtenſible.*

However, theſe Alarms had ſuch an Effect, at that Time, on the Minds of *ſome Men*, that inſtead of adviſing his Majeſty to accede to the *Vienna Treaty*, under any Conditions, They thought it

* *Rouſſet*, vol. 4. p. 222.

† *Obſervations on the Conduct of* Great Britain, *&c.* printed for *Roberts*, in the Year 1729, p. 49. *Craftſman*, vol. 4. p. 245.

it immediately neceſſary to project a *Counter-Allyance*; which was concluded at *Hanover* ſoon after, and laid the Foundation of freſh Diſputes, both at Home and Abroad.

The firſt contracting Parties in *this Treaty* were the Crowns of *Great Britain*, *France* and *Pruſſia*; who invited the *States General*, by an expreſs Article, to accede to it, and agreed to invite others. But the *Dutch*, who had this particular Compliment paid Them in the *Treaty* it ſelf, did not accede to it, till about eleven Months after it had been ſign'd at *Hanover*, and even then under * *very large Reſtrictions*.

About the ſame Time, his Majeſty of *Pruſſia* took an Opportunity of detaching Himſelf from *this Allyance*, in which He was an original Party. Whether this Diviſion was occaſion'd by the Affair of *Thorn*, which was ſuffer'd to dye away, as ſoon as the *Treaty* was made, or by any *other Cauſe*, I cannot ſay; but every good Proteſtant muſt lament any Miſunderſtandings between *two Crowns*, which are ſo nearly ally'd as Thoſe of *Great Britain* and *Pruſſia*.

However, to compenſate this Loſs of *one Ally*, We ſoon gain'd another in the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*, who acceded to this Treaty under certain † Modifications and Reſtrictions, by the perſuaſive Eloquence of Count *Horn*, who acquainted the States *† *that the Treaty of* HANOVER *did not lay Them under ſo many Obligations as* FORMER TREATIES; though They were to receive a Subſidy of *fifty thouſand Pounds a Year*, for *three Years*, both from *England* and *France*, as the Price of their Acceſſion.

The

* *General Collection of Treaties*, &c. printed for *Knapton*, &c. p. 153. † *Ib.* p. 166.

*† *Rouſſet*, vol. 3. p. 309.

The King of *Denmark* was afterwards prevail'd upon to follow the ſame Example, in Conſideration of a *large Subſidy*, for four Years, and other Stipulations in his Favour. It was expreſly agreed in the Treaty that this Subſidy ſhould be paid by the *moſt Chriſtian King*; but a Diſpute ariſing, ſome Years afterwards, between the Crowns of *France* and *Denmark*, concerning the Difference of † *Daniſh* and *Hamburgh* Money, We were ſo good as to prevent the ill Conſequences of ſuch a Diſpute, by paying the Difference our ſelves; which amounted to a conſiderable Sum.

The * *Landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel* contracted likewiſe with his *Britannick Majeſty* to keep a Body of 12,000 Men in a Readineſs for his Service, upon certain Conditions, which do not fully appear in the *publick Convention*, nor any where elſe; but it is well known that *theſe Troops* have coſt the *Britiſh* Nation almoſt a *Million and an half Sterl.* without doing us the leaſt Service, during the whole Time They continued in our Pay.

Amongſt all theſe Allies and Auxiliaries, I muſt not forget his Serene Highneſs the Duke of **† Wolfenbuttle*; who brought up the Rear of this formidable Confederacy, and not only engaged to GUARANTY all his Majeſty's Dominions in *Great Britain*, *Ireland* and *Germany*, but likewiſe to furniſh a Body of 5000 Men (not to be moved out of *Germany*, or *Holland*) for ſo ſmall a Sum as *twenty-five thouſand Pounds per Annum*, during the Space of *four Years*; which amounted, for the whole Term, to no more than *one hundred thouſand Pounds.*

† *Votes of the Houſe of Commons* for the Year 1731-2, or the *Craftſman*, No. 313. * *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 438. *† *Ib.* 178.

Having now ſtated the Caſe of the *Hanover Alliance* in its full Strength, We are naturally led to the Reaſonings of *different Parties*, on this Subject.

The Gentlemen of the *Country Party* argued that, ſuppoſing the *ſecret Treaty of Vienna* to be without Foundation, We were a little too precipitate in throwing off an *old Ally*, under that Pretence; and though They were very far from adopting the vulgar Notion, † *that* ENGLAND *ought never to be in Peace and Friendſhip with* FRANCE, They apprehended that ſo *cloſe a Conjunction*, at that Time, naturally tended to make us too dependent upon Her, and would not produce the good Effects, which were propoſed by it.

To This it was anſwer'd by the *other Party*, that * *Power is fluctuating, and though We did lend the* Emperor *an helping Hand, We are not to let Him do what He pleaſes*; *that when We ſet Him up, it was good Politicks, and now it is equally good to take Him down*; or, as the *† *Enquirer* more gravely argued, *that We ſhould find in* HIM, *at laſt, the Enemy We dreaded only in* ANOTHER. In ſhort, it was then the *Court-Doctrine* that *France* was ſo much reduced, and the *Emperor* grown ſo formidable by the Succeſs of the late War, that the *Ballance of Europe* required us to ſhift Hands, and throw our Weight into the Scale of *France*, which was now become our moſt *natural Ally*. For this Reaſon, it was argued that We might ſafely rely on her *good Faith* and *Sincerity*; nay, a *certain Gentleman* undertook to be her *Guaranty*, and made Himſelf anſwerable for her Conduct,

† *Craftſman*, vol. 1. p. 111. *The Caſe of Dunkirk*, p. 47, or the *Craftſman*, vol. 6. p. 208. * See *a Letter to the occaſional Writer*, printed in the Year 1727; or the *occaſional Writer*, No. 3. p. 13. *† p. 7.

Conduct, by repeated Declarations in the *House of Commons*.

Let us now proceed to the Consequences of *this Alliance*, and see how far the Reasonings of *either Party* were justify'd by them.

As the *Treaty of Hanover* was concerted with a profess'd Design to defeat the dangerous Projects of the *Vienna Allies*; it was evident at first Sight that such Measures would be taken, as must necessarily create some farther Misunderstandings, if not an absolute Rupture, between the different Parties in the *two Allyances*; for when such strong Suspicions are entertain'd on *one Side*, as to put Them in Arms against the *other*, and the *latter* know Themselves to be innocent of the *Designs* laid to their Charge, They will naturally look upon *such Apprehensions* as meer Pretences to pick a Quarrel with Them, and resent those Measures as *Acts of Hostility*, which are carried on under Colour of *self-Defence*.

How far This was our Case, with Relation to the *Spaniards*, at the Time I am speaking of; or how far the *Spaniards*, at least, might reason in such a Manner, will soon appear by the Event.

The Conclusion of the Treaty of *Hanover* was immediately followed with a considerable Augmentation of our *Land-Forces* at home, besides the 12,000 *Hessians*, and *other foreign Troops* retain'd in our Pay, as I have already observed.

At the same Time, *three large Squadrons of Ships of War* were fitted out at a vast Expence, and dispatch'd with all possible Expedition to different Parts of the World; *one* to the *Baltick*, *another* to the Coast of *Spain*, and a *third* to the *West-Indies*. The Motives for equipping *these Fleets*, and the good Effects They produced, are stated very pompously in the *Enquiry*.

That ſent to the * *Baltick*, ſays He, was deſign'd to prevent the *Czarina*'s Scheme for deposing the King of *Sweden*, and thereby preſerve the *Ballance of the North*. But it happened a little untowardly, that *Sweden* had juſt before made Peace with the *Muſcovites*, and was under no Apprehenſion from Them; as They acquainted Sir *Charles Wager*, our Admiral, when He came before *Stockholm*, and made Them a voluntary Offer of his Aſſiſtance. *Another right reverend Gentleman*, who afterwards wrote upon the ſame Subject, tells us that *this Squadron* was ſent to the *Baltick*, not only to prevent the *Czarina*'s Deſign, but † *to enable our* FRIENDS *in* Sweden *to declare for us*, by awing the Duke of *Holſtein*'s Party, who did all in their Power to obſtruct the *Acceſſion*. This, it ſeems, with the *Subſidy* before-mentioned to the *King*, and ſome other proper Applications to the *leading Men*, produced the deſired Effect, and ſufficiently juſtify'd *that Expedition*.

The Squadron ſent to the Coaſts of *† *Spain* was ordered to prevent an Attempt from thence, in Favour of the *Pretender*, by virtue of the *ſecret*, *offenſive Treaty* ſo often mentioned; and the *Enquirer* tells us ** *that the Appearance of* this Fleet *upon the* Spaniſh *Coaſts did actually prevent the Execution of ſuch an Attempt*. But here again *that Writer* ſeems to be miſtaken, or miſinform'd; for it appears by Sir *John Jennings*'s Letter, dated *Aug.* 10, 1726, and made publick here, *†** *that the* Spaniards *were ſo little prepared to* invade *Us*, *that when He came on their Coaſts*, *They ſeem'd to be*

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* *Enquiry*, p. 95.

† *The Treaty of* Seville *impartially conſidered*, printed for *Roberts*, in the Year 1730, p. 10. or the *Craftſman*, vol. 6. p. 66. *† *Enquiry*, p. 95. ** *Ib.* p. 97.

*†** See the *Letter* it ſelf; or the *Craftſman*, vol. 4. p. 266.

be in the greateſt Conſternation; *that all the Troops They could aſſemble did not exceed* three thouſand Men; *and that Thoſe were in very bad Condition.*

As to the Squadron ſent to the *Weſt-Indies*, the * *ſame Author* tells us that it fully anſwered the Purpoſes, for which it was intended, " not only by " protecting the *Trade* of his Majeſty's Subjects " in thoſe Parts from the Depredations of the *Spa-* " *niards*, but alſo by preventing the Return of the " *Galleons* with their Stores of Money, and there- " by diſappointing *thoſe Attempts*, which would " have *been made*, and perhaps ſucceeded, had ſuch " Riches come to their Aid.

Let us now turn our Eyes a little to the *other contracting Powers in the Treaty of Hanover*, and ſee what Part They acted, during all theſe expenſive and hazardous Expeditions on *our Side.*

The *Enquirer* told us that † " the Diſpoſitions " made by FRANCE, ever ſince the ſigning of the " *Treaty of Hanover*, more than kept Pace with " Us, in the Largeneſs of the Expence." To ſupport this Aſſertion, He aſſured us, " that the " *moſt Chriſtian King* augmented his regular " Troops with *twenty-five thouſand Men*; and, at " the ſame Time, ordered a Levy of the *Mi-* " *litia*, to the Number of *ſixty thouſand Men*; " beſides *twelve thouſand Invalids*, put into good " Order, for the Defence of his *Citadels* and " *Forts*; by which Means *that King* could, with- " out Inconvenience, ſend 165,000 Men of his *re-* " *gular Troops* into the Field. Such, *ſays He*, " hath been the Diſpoſition there, for ſome Time, " in order to ſhew the *new Allies* (meaning of " *Vienna*) that *France* is not only in Earneſt, but " in

* *Enquiry*, p. 94. 96. † *Ib.* 102.

" in a well-diſpoſed Condition of diſputing any " Attempts againſt *itſelf*, or its ALLIES.

Now, ſuppoſing all This to be true, it is very far from doing the *Court-Party* any Service in the preſent Argument; for if the *French* had actually made any *ſuch Diſpoſitions*, I believe the *Enquirer* would be very much puzzled to prove that They *more than kept Pace with Us, in the Largeneſs of the Expence*; or that the *Allies* ever received any Benefit from them. But We may go a little farther, and defy Him to prove that there really was any ſuch Augmentation either of their *regular Troops*, or their *Militia*, as He ſeems to aſſert, whatever *Diſpoſitions* might have been made, or *Orders* given for that Purpoſe. Indeed, to ſpeak impartially, the Court of *France* ſeemed ready enough to perform their Engagements with us, againſt the *Emperor*; but We found out, at laſt, that the Execution of them would not be intirely conſiſtent with our *own Intereſt*, and therefore very wiſely excuſed Them.

The *ſame Author* acknowledges *that the* * united Provinces *came late into the Allyance*; which He aſcribes to the *Frame of their Conſtitution*; but, perhaps, it might be partly owing to the *Nature of the Treaty itſelf*; and I am ſure He might have added very juſtly, that They acceded at laſt, under † *very extenſive Limitations*. However, He aſſured us, that " from the Time of their *Acceſ-* " *ceſſion*, They ſhew'd a Warmth and Vigour " worthy of the Occaſion. They agreed unani- " mouſly, *ſaid He*, upon ſuch Augmentations of " their LAND FORCES, as by the next Spring " would make them above 50,000 effective Men; " and the neceſſary Meaſures were taking for their " having

* *Enquiry* p. 103.

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 153.

" having a FLEET at Sea of twenty Men of War." He added, " that They had been at a very great " Charge, in providing their *Magazines*, and put- " ting their *Barrier* and *Frontier Places* into a " good Poſture of Defence.

To This it was anſwered, that the *States* made no farther Augmentation of their *Land-Forces* than what was immediately neceſſary for their own Defence, and the Support of their *Barrier Towns*, in Purſuance of *Treaties*. How far They have put *theſe Places into a good Poſture of Defence*, let their late *Act of Neutrality*, and the preſent State of Affairs determine. As to their *Fleet*, whatever *Meaſures* might have been taken for fitting one out, every Body knows that they were never put in Execution.——But of This I ſhall ſpeak more particularly in another Place.

We were afterwards told, in * *another Treatiſe*, *that his Majeſty*, *as* Elector, *promiſed a Body of* twelve thouſand Men, *to join the* Danes; *and for that Purpoſe increaſed his* Hanoverian *Troops from ſixteen thouſand to twenty two thouſand Men.* But That is a Point, which I am told would bear ſome farther Explanation than the *Author* was pleaſed to give it.—— I ſhall only obſerve that the Deficiency of the *French* Subſidy to *Denmark* was partly made good by certain Deductions out of the Money, granted by Parliament for the Support of the *Heſſian Forces*; and that when † *ſome Gentlemen* deſired to be inform'd whether any more and what Deductions had been made out of *that Money*, the Motion was very prudently rejected.

As

* *Conſiderations on the preſent State of Affairs in* Europe, *&c.* printed for *Roberts* in the Year 1730 p. 16.

† See the *Votes of the Houſe of Commons* for that Year.

As for the Courts of *Sweden*, *Denmark*, *Heſſe* and *Wolfenbuttle*, They were rather *ſtipendiary Auxiliaries* than *Allies* and *Confederates*; ſo that They had little more to do than to receive our Money, in regular Payments, and keep their Troops in a Readineſs to march, whenever We ſhould demand them.——How far They complyed even with theſe Terms, I am not able to ſay, the Nation having never had any Occaſion for their Service.

France and *Holland* were therefore the two Powers, on whom We chiefly rely'd; and as They were much more eſſentially intereſted in the Conſequences of the *Vienna Treaty* than *Great Britain*, We had Reaſon to expect that They ſhould bear, at leaſt, an equal Proportion in the Danger and Expence of oppoſing it. —— This Point therefore ought to be examined a little farther.

I ſaid that immediately after the Concluſion of the *Hanover Treaty*, We diſpatch'd three large Squadrons to the *Baltick*, the *Mediterranean*, and the *Weſt-Indies*. The *firſt* of theſe produced little more Effect than procuring the Acceſſion of *Sweden*, at a very great Expence to this Nation; but the *other two* were attended with Conſequences ſo well known, that they hardly require any Comment. The *Inſtructions* to our Admirals were certainly as moderate as were ever ſent out with *two ſuch naval Armaments*; yet even blocking up the *Galleons* at *Porto Bello* with *one* of them, and hovering round the Coaſts of *old Spain*, in an hoſtile Manner, with the *other*, were look'd upon at that Court as *Acts of Hoſtility*, and reſented accordingly. Orders were immediately diſpatch'd for ſeizing the *South Sea Ship*, and the Effects belonging to that Company at *la vera Cruz*. The *Spaniſh Guarda Coſta's* and *Privateers* were let looſe upon our Merchants,

chants, and committed infinite Depredations for ſeveral Years together, without any Interruption, or any Reprizals. At the ſame Time, the *Flotilla*, which was ſaid to be at leaſt as richly laden as the *Galleons*, had the good Fortune to eſcape our *other Squadron* in the *Mediterranean*, under the Command of Sir *Charles Wager*; though it is confeſs'd † *that They ſteer'd the very Courſe, where He was ſtation'd to intercept them.* But This was imputed to *long Nights*, and *dark, foggy Weather.* It was likewiſe obſerved, and never contradicted, as well as I can remember, that * ſeveral Ships were ſuffer'd to paſs by the *ſame Squadron*, even under the Stern of our Admiral, with *Stores*, *Proviſions* and *other Neceſſaries* for the Uſe of the *Spaniſh* Camp, which was then in Sight of *Gibraltar*, and preparing to beſiege it.——But, perhaps, This likewiſe might be occaſion'd by *long Nights*, and *foggy Weather.*

The Siege of *that Place* immediately enſued; and though We had been often aſſured, both within Doors and without, that our *Allies* would make it *Caſus Fœderis*, and aſſiſt us in the Defence of it, They ſuffer'd the *Siege* to be puſh'd on with the utmoſt Vigour, for ſeveral Months, without giving us the leaſt Succour of *Men*, *Money*, or *Ships*; and the *Spaniards*, in Return, permitted Them to carry on their Trade, both in *Europe* and the *Indies*, without any Moleſtation; whilſt They were continually haraſſing us, both by *Sea* and *Land*; to ſay nothing farther of our *Ships*, which were deſtroyed, and our *Seamen*, who periſhed by Thouſands in the Service of their Country. Perhaps, our *Allies* might judge the *Blockade of Portobello* to be an *Act of Hoſtility*, as well as the

† *Obſervations on the Conduct of* Great Britain, &c. printed for *Roberts* in the Year 1729; p. 33. * *Craftſman*, vol. 4. p. 236.

Spaniards, and conſequently not think Themſelves obliged to ſupport the *aggreſſing Party*, by Virtue of a *defenſive Allyance*. But whatever might be the Reaſons of their Conduct, it is certain that They took no Part in our Quarrels with *Spain*, nor ſo much as moved one Man to our Aſſiſtance. Nay, even *We* contented our ſelves with the bare Defence of *Gibraltar*, ſo loudly demanded by the Voice of the Nation, without endeavouring to divert Them from the Siege, by bombarding any of their Ports, or ravaging their Coaſts; for * *as ſoon as the* Treaties *were made, the* Acceſſions *procured, and the* Army *provided, at the Expence of* Britain, *which were neceſſary for defending lower* Saxony, *We ſeemed to have no more to do in the War.*——Theſe were the *vigorous Meaſures*, ſo ſtrongly recommended in the †† *Enquiry*, as abſolutely neceſſary in ſuch a *Criſis of Danger*, and upon which He founds all his Apology for the Conduct of the *Miniſtry*.

At length, † *Preliminaries* for a general Pacification were agreed upon; by which a *Ceſſation of Hoſtilities*, on both Sides, was ſtipulated for *ſeven Years*; and that within *four Months* after ſigning *this Convention*, a Congreſs ſhould be form'd, in which *all the Rights and* Pretensions *of the contracting Powers ſhould be examined, diſcuſs'd and determined*. But as ſoon as the *Articles* were produced in Publick, it was immediately foreſeen, on *one Side*, that the dark and ambiguous Manner of wording them would give Occaſion to many Cavils and Diſputes; particularly the *ſecond*, which runs in the following myſterious Terms; *viz.*

" *† The Rights, or thoſe Things, which, by

" Vir-

* *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 300. †† *Enquiry*, p. 81, 93, 110. † *General Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 174. *† *Id.* vol. 4. p. 175.

" Virtue of the Treaties of *Utrecht*, *Baden* and " *Quadruple Allyance*, and alſo of *thoſe Treaties* " and *Conventions*, that preceded the Year 1725, " and do not affect the *Emperor* and the States " General of the *united Netherlands*, have been " poſſeſs'd by any of the *contracting Powers*, ſhall " remain untouch'd ; but if any Thing ſhould be " found to have been alter'd therein, or not to " have been put in Execution, the *Alteration made*, " or the *Thing not executed*, ſhall, in a *Congreſs* to " be held, be diſcuſs'd and decided, according to " the Tenor of the ſaid *Treaties* and *Conventions*.

As ſoon, I ſay, as *this Article* was read, many Gentlemen apprehended ſome latent Deſign in it; and the Authors of the † *Craftſman* plainly intimated that this ſtudied Ambiguity was made uſe of to conceal the true Intent of the *Article* from common Obſervation ; I mean *that the* Spaniſh *Pretenſion to* Gibraltar *was to be diſcuſs'd and decided at the* Congreſs.

On the *other Side*, it was aſſerted that *this Article* was ſo far from preſerving the Claim of *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, that it abſolutely extinguiſhed it. This Point was canvaſs'd at large by the * *Author of the Enquiry* and *John Trot*, to whom I refer the Reader, and believe He will find that the *latter* had as much the Advantage of his Adverſary in the *Argument*, as He afterwards had in the *Event*.

It was likewiſe apprehended by the Gentlemen of the *Country Party*, that ſome other Stipulations in the *Preliminaries* were not expreſs'd in ſuch full and plain Terms, as to cut off all Pretences for any farther Wrangling and Chicane. But the Gen-

† *Craftſman*, vol. 2. p. 64, 118 * *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 26. *Craftſman*, vol. 4. p. 288.

tlemen on the *other Side* affected to laugh at these Apprehensions, as the Phantoms of distemper'd Brains, or the Artifices of factious Malecontents congratulating Themselves on having surmounted all Difficulties, and laid the Foundation of a *solid* and *lasting Peace.*

Yet here again the *Country Party* were fully justify'd in their Suspicions by the *Event*; for the *Preliminaries* were no sooner sign'd, than new Disputes began to be started about the *Meaning* of them, † *and such Interpretations to be put upon the Words of* these Articles, *as utterly destroyed the real Intent and Design of them.* The *Spaniards* insisted that a meer *Cessation of Hostilities*, as stipulated by the *Preliminaries*, did not imply an *actual raising of the Siege*; and that the Restitution of the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, was not mentioned, or included in them. Besides This, the Court of *Spain* demanded an *Indulto* of 20 *per Cent.* on the Effects of private Persons, embark'd in the *Flotilla*, contrary to the 5th Article of the *Preliminaries*, as our *Politicians* and their *Advocates* interpreted it.

These Points having been warmly litigated by the different Parties, for eight or nine Months, They were adjusted by *another Convention*, negotiated by the Count *de Rothemburg*, Minister of *France*, (for *We* had no Minister at the Court of *Spain*, at that Time) and sign'd at the *Pardo* the 6th of *March* 1728. *This Instrument* contained an Explanation of the *Preliminaries*, and it was once more solemnly stipulated * *that all the respective* Pretensions, *on each Side, should be produced, debated and decided in the Congress*; with a particular Engagement, *that their* Britannick *and* Catho-

† *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 11. * *General Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 182. *Craftsman*, vol. 4. p. 292.

Catholick *Majeſties would abide by what ſhould be there regulated.*

In the mean Time, it was agreed that the *Britiſh* Squadrons ſhould be order'd, without Delay, to withdraw from the Seas of *old* and *new Spain*; in Conſideration of which, his *Catholick* Majeſty likewiſe engaged that the Blockade of *Gibraltar* ſhould be immediately raiſed; that a clear and expreſs Order ſhould be ſent, without Delay, for reſtoring the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, to the Agents of the *South Sea Company*; and that the Effects of the *Flotilla* ſhould be forthwith deliver'd to the reſpective Proprietors.

Theſe Conditions being accepted, on *both Sides*, his *Catholick* Majeſty ratify'd the *Preliminaries*; but before the Ratifications were exchanged, ſome new Diſputes aroſe, concerning the *Orders*, agreed to be ſent to the *Weſt Indies*, in Purſuance of *this Convention*. Theſe freſh Difficulties took up ſome Time longer; but were likewiſe got over by the Count *de Rothemburg* and Mr. *Vandermeer*, who managed all our Affairs at the Court of *Spain*, and the *Congreſs* was opened at *Soiſſons* on the 3d — 14th of *June* 1728.

This Point being at length obtain'd, after a tedious Courſe of Negotiation and Expedients, the *miniſterial Writers* began to triumph again, as if nothing but the *Form of a Treaty* was wanting to accommodate all our Differences, and eſtabliſh the publick Tranquility on a laſting Foundation. They gave us the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances that all Interruptions to our *Trade* would be effectually removed for the future; that our *plunder'd Merchants* would receive full Satisfaction for their Loſſes; and that our Right to the Poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar* was ſo firmly ſecured to us, by the *Preliminaries*, and the *Act of Ratification*, *that it would not be*

ſo

ſo much as mentioned in the Congreſs. Theſe Things, I ſay, were confidently promiſed by the *miniſterial Writers*, without Doors, and even within Doors by *Thoſe*, who ſet them to work. But as the Gentlemen, on the *other Side*, could ſee nothing in either of *theſe Inſtruments*, which contained any clear and explicit Engagements upon *theſe Heads*, They were not quite ſo ſanguine in their Expectations, and the Event more than warranted all their Suſpicions. The *Plenipotentiaries* did little more than aſſemble in Form at *Soiſſons*, and produce their *Credentials*; after which, having ſpent five or ſix Months in *Ceremonies* and *Diverſions*, They broke up and ſeparated, without adjuſting any one material Point in Diſpute.

It is true, indeed, that a certain Plan of Accommodation, called a *Proviſional Treaty*, was framed by the Miniſters of the *Hanover Allies*, during this Aſſembly, and ſent to the reſpective Courts for their Approbation; but as this *Draught of a Treaty* was neither reliſh'd at home, nor accepted abroad, it does not deſerve much Notice. I ſhall only obſerve, in general, that it was little more than the *Preliminaries* new modelled, and digeſted into the Form of a *Treaty*, without any ſpecifick Explanation of *thoſe Points*, which moſt immediately affected the Intereſts of *Great Britain*.

As to *Gibraltar*, ſeveral noble Peers were ſo far from being ſatisfy'd that our Right to it was effectually ſecured by *this Project*, that the following Motion was made in the *Houſe of Lords*; *viz.* moved to reſolve * " that it is the Opinion of *this* " *Houſe* that, for the Honour of his Majeſty, and " the Preſervation and Security of the Trade and " Commerce of this Kingdom, effectual Care " ſhould

* *Hiſtorical Regiſter*, vol. 14. p. 145.

" ſhould be taken in the *preſent Treaty*, that the " King of *Spain* do renounce all Claim and Pre- " tenſion to *Gibraltar* and the Iſland of *Minorca*, " in *plain* and *ſtrong Terms*." — But after a warm Debate, the Queſtion being put thereupon, it was carried in the Negative; upon which the *Peers*, who made and ſupported *this Motion*, entered their † *Proteſt*.

A Motion to the ſame Purpoſe was afterwards made in the *†† *Houſe of Commons*; which was likewiſe carried in the Negative, by a great Majority.

The *Country Party*, in both Houſes, were equally diſſatisfy'd with that Part of the *Proviſional Treaty*, which related to the *Spaniſh Depredations*; and the *Lords* moved to reſolve, " ** that it ap- " pears to *this Houſe* that the Expence of the " Squadron ſent to the *Weſt-Indies*, under the " Command of Vice-Admiral *Hoſier*, having been " borne by *this Nation* alone, though deſign'd to " prevent the *Spaniards* from ſeizing the Effects " belonging to his Majeſty's *Allies*, as well as his " *Subjects*, which were on board the *Fleta* and " *Galleons*, and from applying the Treaſure to " diſturb the Peace and invade the Liberties of " *Europe*, hath been an unreaſonable Burthen on " this Kingdom."——But this Queſtion was alſo reſolved in the Negative, after a long Debate; upon which the *Country Lords* entered * *another Proteſt*.

If any Perſons ſhould be curious to ſee a more particular Account of *this Treaty*, I refer Them to a †† *Pamphlet*, publiſhed on that Occaſion, and an

† *Hiſtorical Regiſter*, vol. 14. p. 145.
*† *Ib.* p. 147. ** *Ib.* p. 151. * *Ib.*
†† *Obſervations on the Conduct of* Great Britain, *&c.* p 37. printed for *Roberts*, in the Year 1729.

an *Anſwer* to it, under the Name of † *Raleigh*.

It will be found, perhaps, that *this Project* ſerved ſome anniverſary Purpoſes, for which it ſeemed chiefly to be calculated; but as ſoon as thoſe Ends were anſwered, We heard no more of it. The Proſpect of an Accommodation immediately vaniſh'd, and Affairs ſeem'd to be once more tending to a Rupture. Military Preparations were reſumed in all Parts of *Europe*, and particularly in *England*, which is ſeldom behind Hand, upon ſuch Occaſions. A powerful Fleet was fitted out with the utmoſt Expedition, and made a gallant Appearance at *Spithead*, under the Command of Sir *Charles Wager*. It was there join'd by a Squadron of *Dutch* Ships of War, and ſeem'd to portend ſome Enterprize of great Importance; but it afterwards appeared that the *Dutch* Squadron was neither *victualled*, nor otherwiſe *provided*, for any Expedition, and the Admiral Himſelf declared that He had no Orders to attend the *Engliſh* Fleet any farther. Having therefore kept us Company for ſome Months and participated in our *naval Diverſions*, They ſail'd back to *Holland*, and our own Ships ſoon after return'd to their reſpective Harbours.

We were told, indeed, that this PROVISIONAL FLEET, as it was then call'd, ſtruck ſuch a Terror into the Hearts of our Enemies, that We ſoon *†† " heard of their making Advances, com-
" ing into Conceſſions, abating in their Demands,
" removing Obſtacles, giving agreeable Aſſurances,
" and doing the utmoſt could be expected to
" ſhew

† *Craftſman*. vol. 4. p. 239.

*† The *London Journal*, of *Oct.* 1729. or the *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 173.

" ſhew their Inclination to renew the antient A-
" mity ſubſiſting between the two Crowns." Nay, it was ſtrongly inſinuated, in the ſame Paper, that the Preſervation of *Jamaica*, as well as our *own Coaſts* from an Invaſion, the *Sovereignty of the Seas*, the Freedom of our *Commerce*, and even the Security of our *preſent Eſtabliſhment*, were owing to this *formidable Armada*, which frightened our Enemies out of their Deſigns, and at laſt produced the glorious Treaty of *Seville*.

But here it deſerves a ſhort Remark that during theſe Exploits at *Spithead*, a * DAUPHIN was born in *France*, which broke the *Spaniſh* Faction in that Kingdom, and had certainly ſome Influence on the Court of *Spain*, if They could want any Motives to accept of Terms ſo advantageous to Them as were ſtipulated by *that Treaty*.

Thus far the State of our Affairs was, in ſome Meaſure, brought down about four Years ago in a † *little Piece*, occaſioned by the Publication of the Treaty before-mentioned, and ſome †† *Obſervations* upon it. This gave Riſe to new Diſputes, of which I am now to give ſome Account.

It cannot be thought wonderful that the *Court Writers* and their *Patrons*, who triumph'd ſo much the Year before on the *meer Project*, or *Draught of a Treaty*, ſhould diſcover the ſame Spirit of Exultation upon procuring a *formal Treaty*, actually ſign'd, which the *† *Writer* before me obſerves *is beyond the Reach of the moſt artful Malice*; though there was ſtill wanting the Acceſſion of *one Power*, whoſe Conſent was moſt neceſſary to the putting it

* *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 177.

† *A ſhort View of the State of Affairs*, &c. ſince publiſhed in the *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 245.

†† *Obſervations upon the Treaty concluded at* Seville, &c. Printed for *Roberts* in the ſame Year. *† *Id.* p. 7.

in Execution; for as the Introduction of 6000 *Spaniſh* Forces into the ſtrong Places of *Tuſcany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, inſtead of 6000 *Neutrals* ſtipulated by the *Quadruple Allyance*, was the Baſis of the *Seville Treaty*, the Concurrence of the *Emperor*, to whom the *Feodality of thoſe States* belong'd, was certainly requiſite to the amicable Execution of it, according to the Doctrine of the *Enquiry* itſelf, where it is aſſerted †† *that* HE ALONE *was capable of diſturbing it.* And yet *He* was not ſo much as complimented, in the *Treaty*, with an Invitation to accede, as the *Dutch* again were by an expreſs Article.

It was therefore thought expedient to uſher *this Treaty* into the World with ſome *explanatory Obſervations* upon it. They could not help foreſeeing that their own Arguments upon *this Subject* were capable of being turned very ſtrongly againſt Them. They knew very well that the *Author of the Enquiry* had been inſtructed, but three Years before, to alarm the *Britiſh Nation* with the formidable Projects, in Favour of † *Don Carlos*, even ſo far as *univerſal Monarchy*. They could not forget that the Author of the * *Britiſh Journal*, (who now makes ſo ſhining a Figure in the *Free Briton*) but a few Months before repreſented the Eſtabliſhment of *this Prince* in *Italy* as a Point of ſuch dangerous Conſequence, that it was oppoſed, at the Congreſſes of *Cambray* and *Soiſſons*, by all the principal Powers of *Europe*; particularly *Great Britain*;

" Since, if *Don Carlos* ſhould ever ſucceed to " *Tuſcany*, LEGHORN the Mart of our *Mediter-* " *ranean* Trade, will be in his Poſſeſſion; and " conſequently *Spain* will have Power, at any Time, " to

†† *Enquiry*, p. 9. † *Ib.* p. 22. 28. 86.

* See the *Britiſh Journal* of *Jan.* 4, 1728-9; or the *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 80.

" to deprive us of Commerce in the *Levant*, as " well as the *Weſt Indies*.

" In which Caſe, *ſays He*, it will be nearly the " ſame, as if We give up *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*; " becauſe thoſe Places will be of little Service to " our *Mediterranean* Commerce, when the Marts " of that Trade ſhall intirely exclude us from all " Traffick.

This, I ſay, was the Doctrine advanced by the Author of the *Britiſh Journal*, in the Month of *January*, 1728-9; and maintain'd, in another Place, by an *eminent Stateſman*, who had the Honour of conducting our foreign Negotiations for ſeveral Years together; but a new Turn of Affairs, a few Months afterwards, laid Them under a Neceſſity of recanting theſe Arguments in the fulleſt Manner, and extolling that *very Succeſſion*, which They had ſo lately condemn'd, as a * *Maſterpiece of Politicks, and one of the beſt good Fortunes, which could befal this Nation.*

However, ſuch glaring Contradictions from the ſame Mouths, and in ſo ſhort a Courſe of Time, were thought to require ſome farther Apology, before the *Parliament* met. It was upon this Occaſion, that the *Obſervations* were publiſhed, and diſperſed through the Kingdom by *Authority*, as I remember.——Now, the principal Arguments in *this Piece* are reducible to the following Heads;

Firſt, † " That *Great Britain* will be a con- " ſiderable Gainer by *this Variation*, as We are " freed from the Engagement We were before " under, of paying one *third Part of the Expence*, " which would have been requiſite for maintain-

* The *Britiſh Journal* ſign'd *Thomas Potts*, publiſh'd in *Aug.* 1729; or the *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 101.

† *Obſervations*, p. 12.

" ing *neutral Garrisons* in the Dutchies of *Tus-*
" *cany* and *Parma*.

Secondly, * " That had the Succession to " *Tuscany* and *Parma* been left open, all *Italy*, con- " sidering the Strength of the *Emperor* in that " Country, must have probably fallen into his " Hands, or at least into such Hands as must have " had an entire Dependance on Him; with some very severe Reflections on his *Imperial Majesty*, as a Prince, " who had made but ill Returns of Gra- " titude to *this Nation*, for having already con- " tributed to his Grandeur in that Part of the " World.

And *thirdly*, " † That the *Emperor* cannot " reasonably take Offence at *this Stipulation*, being " Himself under previous Engagements, by the " *Quadruple Allyance*, to make the Succession of " *Don Carlos* effectual. ——Neither can the *Vari-* " *ation*, made by the *present Treaty*, of *Spanish* " instead of *Swiss Garrisons*, justify, in Reason " and good Sense, his *Imperial Majesty's* not con- " senting to it, unless He can shew that He may " be prejudiced by *that Alteration*.

To the *first* of these Arguments it was readily answer'd, *† that the Charge of maintaining 2000 Men in *Italy*, for some Time, ought not to be put in Ballance against the Dangers We should run of involving our selves in a War, by undertaking to effectuate the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops, and to guaranty this Succession for ever, †† *so that it may rest secure and exempt from* ALL EVENTS. ——It might have been added, that this Plea of *Frugality* was somewhat improperly urged at a Time, when the Nation was at the Expence of main-

* *Observations*, p. 9. † *Id.* p. 10.
*† *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 266.
†† See the *Treaty*, Art. 9, 10, 11, 12.

maintaining ſo many numerous Bodies of Men, both Abroad and at Home, without the ſame Reaſon.

The *ſecond Argument* is built on the formidable Power of the *Emperor*, which was the fashionable Doctrine at that Time; and from thence it was argued that *this Variation* was neceſſary to prevent his over-running all *Italy*. In Anſwer to This it was obſerved by the Gentlemen, on the *other Side*, * that if his *Imperial Majeſty* was really ſo ſtrong in *thoſe Parts* as He was repreſented, He would be able to give ſuch an Oppoſition to the Execution of the *Treaty*, as would *plunge us in the greateſt Difficulties*. But They went farther, and deſired to take the *contrary* of This for granted.—— † " Let us ſuppoſe *(ſays one of theſe Writers)* " that the Introduction and Eſtabliſhment of the " *Spaniards* in *Italy* ſhould be made with ſo " ſuperior a Power, that the *Emperor* and *Prin-* " *ces* concern'd are forc'd to ſubmit upon *our* " *Terms*, inſtead of making *their own*; will the " Difficulties be all removed? Will all the Incon- " veniences to *Great Britain*, with which *this* " *Treaty* may be attended, vaniſh away? They " certainly will not. *Our Meaſures* are ſo wiſely " taken, that the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt Manner of " *effectuating* them is likewiſe the eaſieſt and ſhort- " eſt Way to render *the little We have ſtipulated* " *for our ſelves* precarious.

But, *thirdly*, though the Introduction of *Spaniſh Garriſons* was recommended, under the laſt Article, as a neceſſary Expedient to curb the *Emperor's* exorbitant Power; yet We were likewiſe told, a little paradoxically, *that He could not reaſonably take Offence at it*; *nor juſtify his not conſenting to it*; *unleſs*

* *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 265. 289.
† *Ib.* 293.

unleſs He could ſhew that He might be prejudiced by that Alteration. Now this very Conceſſion, as the *Country Gentlemen* obſerved, was in Effect giving up the whole Cauſe; ſince his *Imperial Majeſty* might eaſily ſhew *that He ſhould be prejudiced by ſuch an Alteration*; and here, indeed, lies the whole Streſs of the Argument upon this Point.

It was allow'd, on the *Country Side*, that the *Emperor* was a Party in the *Quadruple Allyance*, which eſtabliſh'd *this Succeſſion*, and had thereby engaged to make it effectual. But They could not agree with the *Obſervator* and his *Patrons*, concerning the *Variation* in Diſpute, for ſeveral Reaſons, which I will ſum up in as few Words as poſſible.

In the *firſt Place*, They apprehended that ſuppoſing *this Alteration* not to be prejudicial to the Intereſts of his *Imperial Majeſty*; yet that the * *Manner* of making it, without his *Conſent*, and by Way of *Triumph* over Him, as a great Fetch in Politicks, would be thought a Reflection upon his *Honour*, at leaſt, and might be attended with fatal Conſequences.

But They likewiſe undertook to prove that the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Troops would be really prejudicial both to the *Emperor* and the *Empire*, even according to the *Obſervator's* Method of Reaſoning; for He plainly intimated that one Deſign of the *Seville Treaty* was to reſtrain the *Emperor's* Power in *Italy*; and conſequently it was *his Intereſt* to defeat that Deſign, however it might be the Intereſt of *others* to put it in Execution.

This avow'd End of the *Seville Treaty* was aggravated by *another*, which was likewiſe cry'd up by the *miniſterial Writers* as a *Maſterpiece of Politicks*; I mean the Separation of *Spain* from the *Emperor*

* *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 264.

Emperor, and thereby diſſolving the *Vienna Allyance*, which had been repreſented ſo very advantageous to the *latter*. Did not This affect the Intereſt of his *Imperial Majeſty*; or could it be reaſonably expected that He would not reſent it?

Nay, They went ſtill farther, and I think demonſtrated that the Variation from *Neutral* to *Spaniſh Troops* (without inſiſting on the *Affront*, or having any Regard to the *Vienna Allyance*) was highly prejudicial both to the *Emperor* and the *Empire*; for the *neutral Troops*, ſtipulated by the *Quadruple Allyance*, were deſigned not only to ſecure the † *eventual Succeſſion of Don Carlos*, *but likewiſe* the *Rights of Sovereignty eſtabliſhed in the* EMPEROR *and* EMPIRE *over theſe States*. Now this Part of the Condition was intirely revers'd by the *Variation* in Diſpute; and the *Obſervator's* Argument, upon this Head, was of Courſe reduced to the following Abſurdity; * "that when a *mu-* "*tual Security* is given and accepted by *two Par-* "*ties*, for making good a Bargain, this Security "may be taken from *one of the Parties* againſt his "Conſent, and the Benefit of it be wholly ap- "ply'd to the *other*, and yet no Prejudice be done "to the *former*.

To This it was added, by the Writers on the *Country Side*, that his *Imperial Majeſty* appeared very plainly to look upon the Introduction of *Spaniſh Troops* in this Light, by refuſing to conſent to it, whilſt He was under ſo beneficial an Allyance with *Spain*, and *† even ſuffering Himſelf to be diſunited from *that Crown* rather than comply. His Reaſon for This was very obvious; ſince if the Court of *Spain* had no other Deſign than to ſecure the

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 57. *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 285. * *Ib.* 287. *† *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 264

the Dutchies of *Tuſcany* and *Parma* for *Don Carlos*, according to the *Quadruple Allyance*, it is certain that *neutral Troops* would have been effectual for that Purpoſe; nay, more effectual than *Spaniſh Troops*, if We may believe the *Enquiry*, where the † NEUTRAL GARRISONS, appointed by the *Quadruple Allyance*, are call'd *the great Bulwarks of the Succeſſion of* Don Carlos *to Tuſcany*; but their reſolute Perſeverance in deſiring and inſiſting on *Spaniſh Garriſons* gave his *Imperial Majeſty* juſt Grounds to apprehend ſome farther View; and one of the Writers on the *Country Side* ſeems to be pretty right in his Conjectures, upon this Occaſion.

* " We all know, *ſays He*, how precious the " Poſſeſſions of *Italy* are to the *Imperialiſts*; how " much the Point, to which They are arrived in " that Country, of Dominion, Power, and In- " fluence, hath been always the chief Object of " their Policy. —— Now will it be at all ſtrange, " if They look on the *Variation* made in the *Qua-* " *druple Allyance* as a Meaſure taken to give " Them a *Rival in that Country*, where They " are at preſent indiſputably the *ſuperior Power?* " Will not theſe Garriſons of *Spaniards*, preten- " ded to be placed there for the Security of the " eventual Succeſſion of *Don Carlos*, make Them " look on *Parma*, *Placentia*, *Portoferraio*, and " *Leghorn*, as ſo many Places of Arms, put into " the Hands of an *old Enemy*, an *unfaithful Ally*, " and a *certain Rival?* May They not apprehend " that neither Pretences, nor Means will be want- " ing, if the Treaty of *Seville* hath its Effect, to " introduce greater Numbers of *Spaniſh*, and even " *French* Troops into the Heart of *Italy*, and to " ſerve

† *Enquiry*, p. 25. * *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 288.

" ſerve the *Emperor* as *Ferdinand the Catholick* " ſerved *Lewis the* 12*th*, in Conſequence of the " ſilly Partition, to which the *latter* conſented.

In another Piece, the Conſequences of the *Seville Treaty* are farther explained and foretold.

† " It is ſaid, that *France* and *England* are " Guaranties for the *Emperor's* Dominions in *Italy* " againſt any Encroachments, which *Spain* may " attempt to make upon them.

" I anſwer, that the Purpoſes of the *Quadruple* " *Allyance* would have been effectually ſecured by " *neutral Troops*; but it is extremely probable that " the Introduction of *Spaniards* will be followed " by Invaſions on the *Emperor's* Dominions; for " though the Introduction of only 6000 *Spaniards* " is ſtipulated, yet if They are put in Poſſeſſion " of *Leghorn*, They may admit as many more as " They pleaſe by the Help of their *Fleet*, which " is large enough for that Purpoſe, and will be " as good as a Bridge between *Italy* and *Spain*. " In this Caſe, *France* will not be very forward to " execute their Engagements of Guaranty in the " *Emperor's* Behalf; and if *England* does, ſhe " muſt loſe her Trade to *Spain* and *Leghorn*. If " *France* ſhould think fit to quarrel with the *Em-* " *peror*, They would encourage *Spain* to invade his " *Italian* Dominions; and when the *Emperor* com- " plains of it, They will, without much Difficulty, " (according to the modern Way of interpreting " the Obligations of Treaties) find out ſome Act " or other of the *Emperor*, which They will al- " ledge as a Reaſon for his having forfeited a " Right to *that Guaranty*.

Upon the whole, it was concluded by *theſe Writers* that his *Imperial Majeſty* would not conſent to

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† *The Caſe of the* Heſſian *Fortes, &c.* ſince publiſhed in the *Craftſman*, vol. 6. p. 311.

the Introduction of *Spaniſh Garriſons*, unleſs He ſhould be bought into it by † *another Expedient*, which might prove equally productive of bad Conſequences; I mean our Guaranty of the PRAGMATICK SANCTION.

They likewiſe obſerved, with too much Reaſon, that as the Reconciliation of *Spain* and the *Emperor*, by the *firſt Vienna Treaty*, was the luckieſt Circumſtance, which could poſſibly happen to us at that Time, and ought to have excited our Joy, inſtead of alarming us with ſuch a terrible Panick; ſo They apprehended * *that the Separation of thoſe* two Courts *would be followed by a new Union between* France *and* Spain *more formidable to* Us *than* That, *which We had diſſolv'd.*

We were told, indeed, *† *that if* Spain *ſhould preſume to break the Bounds of Power in* Italy, *there are formidable Princes will riſe in Oppoſition*; *perhaps* OUR SELVES. But to This it was anſwer'd, that beſides the ridiculous Employment of being always *doing and undoing*, *France* might recover ſo much Strength, and the *Emperor* be ſo far reduced by *theſe Meaſures*, that it would not be in our Power to ſet Matters upon their right Foot again. Upon this Suppoſition, *one of the Writers on the Country Side* made the following Obſervation, which deſerves particular Attention at this Time.

†† "If the whole Weight of national Vengeance is ever to fall, it ought ſurely to cruſh "*Thoſe*, who precipitate their Country, by a long "Series of Blunders and Miſtakes, into ſuch a "terrible *Dilemma*, that We cannot obſerve our "*Treaties*, without being expoſed to fight againſt our

† *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 292. * *Craftſman*, vol. 6. p. 308.
*† *Britiſh Journals of Aug.* 1729, or the *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 100. †† *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 291.

" our *general Intereſts*, and without finding, when " We return to them, that the *Weakneſs of our* " *Allies* and the *Strength of our Enemies* are the " Works of our *own Hands*.

I believe This will be thought ſufficient to explain the Reaſonings on *both Sides*, concerning the Introduction of *Spaniſh Garriſons* into *Italy*, † *which made one of the principal Stipulations of the new Treaty*, as the *Obſervator* very frankly acknowledg'd. But it was natural to enquire what Terms We had obtained for *our ſelves*, in Return for ſuch valuable Obligations on the Court of *Spain*.

To ſatisfy this juſt Expectation, We were aſſured by the *Obſervator* * " that our *Poſſeſſions* " *abroad* were ſecured to us, beyond all Poſſibi- " lity of Doubt, or Cavil; that all our Privileges " and Advantages in *Commerce* were re-eſtabliſhed " upon the Foot of former Treaties; and that " immediate Reparation was ſtipulated to our " *Merchants* for all the Damages They had ſuf- " fer'd at any Time, contrary to the Treaties of " *Utrecht*, or any other Treaties, which ſubſiſted " between *England* and *Spain* to that very Day.

But the *Writers on the other Side* could not find any Articles, or Words in the *Treaty*, which could be fairly interpreted ſo as to juſtify theſe Aſſurances, or to deſerve thoſe Encomiums, which were beſtowed upon it.

They obſerved that the *Spaniards* were ſo far from having renounc'd their Pretenſions to *Gibraltar*, or recogniz'd our Right to the Poſſeſſion of it, that it is not ſo much as mentioned through the whole Treaty; and it hath been ſince confeſs'd by an *honourable Gentleman*, in an high Station, *† *that if We had offer'd to mention any*

† *Obſervations on the Treaty of Seville*, p. 3. &c. * *Id.* p. 14. *† *Craftſman*, vol. 6. p. 38.

Thing about Gibraltar, *the* Spaniards *would have broke off all farther Negotiations.* We were likewiſe told by one of his *Advocates*, *that* Gibraltar *was an old Sore, and that our* Miniſters *were deſirous to touch it tenderly*; That is, the Court of *Spain* would not admit of any Words in the *Treaty*, which would annihilate their Pretenſions, and did not deſign to include our Poſſeſſion of *that Place* in their general Guaranty of *all his Majeſty's Kingdoms, States and Dominions.* How therefore could it be ſaid with Truth, as the *Obſervator* affirm'd, that *We had a very full Acknowledgment, on the Part of* Spain, *of our Right to* Gibraltar *and the Iſland of* Minorca; *or that* thoſe Poſſeſſions *were ſecured to us, beyond all Poſſibility of Doubt, or Cavil*; when We had obtained no other Security for Them, than what was before complained of in the *Preliminaries*, the *Convention of the Pardo*, and the *Proviſional Treaty?* I mean, a Confirmation of all *former Treaties*, and conſequently That of *Madrid* in the Year 1721, upon which the *Spaniards* ground their Claim to the Reſtitution of *Gibraltar*?

They likewiſe apprehended that the Proviſions made in this *Treaty* for the future Security of our *Commerce*, and Reparation to our *Merchants* for their paſt Sufferings, would prove ineffectual. Theſe Proviſions were, that * *Commiſſaries* ſhould be appointed on the Part of their *Britannick* and *Catholick* Majeſties, who ſhould aſſemble at the Court of *Spain*, to examine and decide all Differences upon theſe Heads; with an expreſs Stipulation, *that They ſhould punctually finiſh their* Commiſſion *within the Space of* three Years *from the Day of ſigning the preſent Treaty, without any farther Delay, on any Motive, or Pretext whatever.*

It

* *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 204.

It was apprehended, I ſay, on the *Country Side*, that theſe Proviſions would be very liable to Evaſion, by the *Diſtance of Place*, where the *Commiſſaries* were to meet, the *Length of Time*, allow'd for this Enquiry, and the ſeveral Points, of which it was to conſiſt; particularly * " the Pretenſions of " his *Catholick Majeſty* to the Reſtitution of the " Ships taken in the *Mediterranean*, in the Year " 1718; an Article, which may be ſo caſt up by " the *Spaniſh Commiſſaries* as to overballance the " Account of the *Britiſh* Merchants, by ſeveral " hundred thouſand Pounds.

On the *other Side* it was aſſerted, that " † the " Reſtitution of our Loſſes ſince *June* 1727 was " to be *immediate* and *forthwith*, as well as the In- " troduction of the *Spaniſh Garriſons* was to be " *without Loſs of Time*; and that the Affair of " the *Merchants* ſtood PRIOR in the Treaty to " the *Tuſcan Affair*, and, ſo far as it was to be " *without Loſs of Time*, muſt have the Preference; " nay, if it was not performed *immediately*, no- " thing was obliged to be done in Favour of *Don* " *Carlos*.

Indeed, it was reaſonable enough to expect that the *Spaniards* ſhould have been obliged to make our *Merchants* Reparation for their Loſſes, before We gratify'd Them in ſo favourite a Point as the Introduction of *Don Carlos*. But though the Article of *Reparation* happened to ſtand *prior* in the Treaty to the *Tuſcan Affair*, as *this Writer* moſt ſagely obſerved, yet the Adjudication of the *former* being left to *Commiſſaries*, who had *three Years* allowed to finiſh their Enquiry, and the *latter* being to be effectuated *without Loſs of Time*, it was

* *Craftſman*, vol. 5. p. 270.

† The *Free-Briton extraordinary*, in Anſwer to the *Short View*; printed for *Peele*, in the Year 1730, p. 45.

was eaſy to perceive which would have the Preference; and This furniſhed one Objection, of no ſmall Weight, againſt the *Treaty* itſelf; in which † "We ſeem'd to make juſt ſuch a *Bargain*, as "We made in the *Quadruple Allyance*; when We "put *Sicily*, and all that the *Emperor* had to ex- "pect from our *Friendſhip*, into his Hands imme- "diately; although the reciprocal Part, to be per- "formed by *Him*, was to be a Work of Time; "and although We had not received Satisfaction "from Him in *ſome Points*, about which We were "extremely ſollicitous.

Theſe Reaſonings without Doors, concerning the Treaty of *Seville*, had likewiſe the Honour to be ſtrengthened by the Arguments of ſeveral noble Lords and Gentlemen of great Diſtinction, within Doors; particularly in the *Houſe of Peers*, where the following Motions were made; *viz.*

Die Martis 27 *Jan.* 1729.

Moved to reſolve * "that the Agreement in "the Treaty of *Seville* to effectuate the Introduc- "tion of *Spaniſh* Troops into *Tuſcany* and *Parma*, "is a manifeſt Violation of the fifth Article of "the *Quadruple Allyance*, tends to involve the "Nation in a dangerous and expenſive War, and "to deſtroy the Ballance of Power in *Europe*.

"*After Debate, the Queſtion was put upon the* "*ſaid Motion, and it was reſolved in the* Negative.

Moved to reſolve "that our Right of Sove- "reignty, Dominion, Poſſeſſion and Propriety to "*Gibraltar*, and the Iſland of *Minorca*, is not aſ- "certain'd by the Treaty of *Seville*, ſo as to ex- "tinguiſh the Claims and Pretenſions ſet up by "the *Spaniards*, which were followed by an ac- "tual

† *Craftſman*, vol. 5 p. 293.
* *Hiſt. Regiſter*, vol. 15, p. 202.

" tual Siege, ſince the Ceſſion of thoſe valuable " Places by the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

" *After Debate, the Queſtion was put thereon,* " *and reſolved in the* Negative.

Moved to reſolve " that the Stipulations in the " Treaty of *Seville*, for repairing the Loſſes of " our *Merchants*, are inſufficient and precarious.

" *After Debate, the Queſtion was put thereupon,* " *and it was reſolved in the* Negative.

Then it was propoſed, by ſome *other Lords*, to reſolve " that the Treaty of Peace, Union and " Friendſhip, concluded at *Seville* the 9th of *No-* " *vember* laſt, doth contain all neceſſary Stipula- " tions for maintaining and ſecuring the *Honour*, " *Dignity*, *Rights*, and *Poſſeſſions of the Crown*; " and that all due Care is taken therein for the " Support of the *Trade* of the Kingdom, and for " repairing the Loſſes ſuffered by the *Merchants*.

" *After Debate, the Queſtion was put thereupon,* " *and it was reſolved in the* Affirmative; *upon* " *which ſeveral Lords entered their* * Proteſt *againſt* " *it, with their Reaſons at large, which deſerve par-* " *ticular Notice at this Time.*

I ſhall now proceed, according to the Method propoſed, to a few ſhort Remarks on the Effects of *this Treaty*.

In the firſt Place, it is obſervable that his *Imperial Majeſty* was ſo far from looking on the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons into *Tuſcany* and *Parma* as a trifling Variation from the *Quadruple Allyance*, according to the Doctrine of the *Court Writers*, that He reſented both the *Matter* and the *Manner* of it in the ſtrongeſt Terms, as a downright *Infraction of Treaties*, derogatory to his *Honour*, and injurious to his *Intereſts*, as well as the Rights

* *Ib.*

Rights of the *Empire*. He ordered his *Miniſters* at ſeveral Courts to remonſtrate againſt it as ſuch; and ſent a † *Commiſſorial Decree* to the Diet at *Ratisbon*; in which, having vindicated his own Conduct to the *States of the Empire*, there aſſembled, with Relation to *Don Carlos*, He ſpeaks of the *preſent Stipulation* in the following Manner. — " But contrary to all Expectation, a particular " Treaty hath been concluded at *Seville*, between " the Crowns of *Spain*, *France*, and *Great Britain*; " the 9th and ſubſequent Articles of which (*rela-* " *ting to the* Spaniſh *Garriſons*) cannot but raiſe " the higheſt Indignation; becauſe the moſt eſſen- " tial Bands of human Society are therein broken, " and if *Chriſtian Powers* pretend thus to diſpoſe " of the Eſtates of *third Perſons*, all Confidence " and good Faith ought to be baniſhed out of " the World. Beſides, They have no Regard to " *former Treaties*, nor to the laſt *Preliminary Ar-* " *ticles*, which were acknowledged by *both Parties* " as the Groundwork of the Negotiations for the " *general Peace*, and as the only Counterpoiſe to " an exorbitant Power, that was deſign'd to be e- " rected in *Europe*. They have no Attention to the " *Acts of Guaranty*, that have been delivered. They " diſpoſe of the Rights and Territories of the *Em-* " *pire* as They pleaſe, even in the Life-time of " the *lawful Poſſeſſors*. They ſet ſo little a Value " upon the *Emperor* and *Empire*, that They would " not ſo much as ask their *Conſent* in an Affair, " that was properly their own, though *ſuch Conſent* " was made neceſſary by the Allyance of *London*. " —If therefore *ſuch Conduct* takes Place, and the " *new Allies* perſiſt therein, We ſhall hereafter ſee " *Might* overcome *Right*, and *Engagements* tram- " pled

† *Hiſtorical Regiſter*, vol. 15. p. 134.

" pled on at Pleaſure; and whatever the *new Allies* " ſhall judge to be moſt convenient will always be " moſt juſt, without any Regard to *Things*, or " *Perſons*.

His *Imperial Majeſty* likewiſe repreſents to the *Germanick Body*, as a Merit to Himſelf, * " that " the Fear of being abandon'd by his Ally, the " King of *Spain*, was not capable of making Him " take the leaſt Step, that could prejudice *his Dig-* " *nity*, and That of the *Empire*.

The Court of *Vienna* did not content Themſelves, like ſome *other Politicians*, with ſhewing their Reſentments in *Words* and *Appearances* only; but actually pour'd a large Army into *Italy* with Orders to oppoſe the Execution of the *Treaty*, and found Means to maintain Them there all the following Summer, notwithſtanding the Suggeſtions of the *Court-Party*, and the wiſe Precautions We took, by an † *Act of Parliament*, to prevent the Subjects of this Kingdom from lending Him any Money.

When the Allies of *Seville* found the *Emperor* in Earneſt, and fully determined to ſtand upon his Defence, They began to halt and beat a Parley. The Cabinets of *Europe* were again employed in framing *Expedients*; Couriers were continually paſſing from Court to Court, and the publick Prints amus'd us with nothing but new Plans, or new Reports of Accommodation; whilſt a large *Fleet* lay in the Road of *Barcelona*, and a numerous Body of *Land Forces* were aſſembled on the neighbouring Coaſts, ready to embark upon the firſt Notice for the intended Expedition. But his *Imperial Ma-*

* *Ib.*

† See an Act, *to prohibit his Majeſty's Subjects, to lend any Sums of Money to any foreign Prince, State, or Potentate, &c.* in the Year 1739.

jesty having rejected all the Propositions made to Him, for acceding to the Treaty of *Seville*, and seeming determin'd to abide Extremities, rather than consent to their Measures; that Summer wore out in Negotiation only, and the *Spanish Armada* retired to their Harbours, without any Action, like our Fleet at *Spithead*, the Year before.

The Introduction of *Don Carlos* with *Spanish* Troops into *Italy* being thus protracted; the Performance of the Articles, in our Favour, was likewise suspended. The *Spaniards* not only continued the Blockade of *Gibraltar*, in the most rigorous Manner, so as to cut off all Communication with the Country; but likewise projected some *new Works* for annoying our Ships in the Bay, which have been since finished. Instead of making our *Merchants* any *immediate Reparation*, by Virtue of that *Priority* in the Treaty, which the *Court-Writers* discovered, They did not so much as nominate *Commissaries*, on their Part, for adjusting those Losses; and seem'd to think Themselves free from all Engagements towards us, till the Stipulations, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, were effectually put in Execution.

Thus did Affairs continue in a doubtful Situation between *Peace* and *War*, as They had continued for several Years past, till the Season of *Parliament* in *Great Britain* came round again; That is, till the Beginning of the Year 1731; about which Time, a private Negotiation at *Vienna*, between *Great Britain* and the *Emperor*, began to get Air, and was first hinted to the Publick in the famous HAGUE LETTER, printed in the * *Craftsman*; which, having since received a *judicial Censure*, I am not at Liberty to quote, tho' it

* *Craftsman*, No. 235. *Sat. Jan.* 2, 1730-1.

it would be of great Uſe to my preſent Purpoſe; but as it was chiefly built on the 4th Article of the *Hanover Treaty*, and the bad Conſequences, which might attend any *Breach* of it, I muſt content my ſelf with laying *that Article* before the Reader. It runs in the following Terms, *viz.*

† " And as the ſaid *three moſt ſerene Kings* are " are reſolved to bind more and more cloſely the " ſtrict Union, that ſubſiſts amongſt Them, by all " poſſible Tokens of *good Faith* and *mutual Con-* " *fidence*, They have reciprocally agreed, not only " to enter into *no Treaty*, *Allyance*, or *Engagement* " whatever, which may in any Manner whatever " *be contrary to the Intereſts of each other*; but even " faithfully to *communicate to each other the* Propo- " ſals, *that may be made to Them*, and not to take, " upon what may be propoſed, any *Reſolution*, o- " therwiſe than in *Concert together*, and after a *joint* " *Examination* of what may conduce to their *com-* " *mon Intereſts*, and be proper for maintaining the " Ballance of *Europe*, which is ſo neceſſary to be " preſerved for the Good of the *general Peace.*

In leſs than three Months after the *Hague Letter* was publiſhed, a Treaty of Peace and Allyance was actually concluded at *Vienna* between the *Emperor* and the King of *Great Britain*, in which the *States General* were likewiſe included; but neither *France*, nor *Spain* were ſo much as mentioned in it; which ſeem'd to be ſomewhat extraordinary as to the *latter*, at leaſt, ſince the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons into *Italy*, with the *Emperor's* Conſent, made one of the principal Stipulations of this *new Treaty*; nay, what is ſtill more ſurprizing, it was with extreme Difficulty that They were brought into it at laſt, and even then not without inſiſting on ſeveral Alterations in the *Act of Appro-*

 bation;

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 149. *Craftſman*, vol 7. p. 223.

bation; one of which, if I do not forget, was that the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with 6000 *Spaniſh* Troops into *Italy* ſhould be effectuated PREVIOUSLY to the Execution of any Engagements on their Part, however They might ſtand PRIOR in the Treaty of *Seville*; which, by the Way, was concluded above a *Year and an half before*. The *Dutch* were ſtill more backward in their Acceſſion, and did not accede at laſt without ſome * *wiſe Reſtrictions*. As for the Court of *France*, They were ſo far from liſtening to any Sollicitations on this Head, that They exerted their utmoſt Endeavours to prevent the Concurrence of *Spain*. Nay, They expreſs'd ſuch a Reſentment both againſt the *Treaty* itſelf, and the *Manner* of negotiating it, that We apprehended nothing leſs than an *Invaſion* from *Dunkirk*, where ſome Troops were aſſembled. This ſtruck us, all on a Sudden, with ſuch a Terror, that the Coaſts of *Kent* were immediately cover'd with Regiments of Horſe, Foot, and Dragoons, who were order'd to march thither, with the utmoſt Precipitation, from all Parts of the Kingdom; and the Fluctuation, which ſuch an Alarm naturally occaſion'd in our *Stocks*, afforded the Caterpillars of the *Alley* a plentiful Harveſt.

However, theſe Apprehenſions being ſoon diſſipated, Sir *Charles Wager* was again diſpatch'd to the Coaſts of *Spain* with a large Squadron of *Engliſh* Ships, in order to wait upon *Don Carlos* and the *Spaniſh* Troops to his new Dominions. The *Admiral Ship* was fitted out in a moſt ſplendid and coſtly Manner, for the Reception of his *ſerene Highneſs*; but after a Courſe of pompous Compliments and Viſits between the *Commander of the Spaniſh Fleet* and *our Admiral*, upon his Arrival at *Cadiz*,

* *Rouſſet*, Tom. 2. p. 343. 410. Edit.

Cadiz, and the ſame Honours having been afterwards paid Him at the Court of *Seville*, his *Catholick Majeſty* was pleaſed to diſcharge Him from the Trouble of taking *Don Carlos* under his Care, and required no more at his Hands than to convoy the *Spaniſh* Troops to *Italy*, in Conjunction with his *own Admiral*. The combin'd Fleet accordingly ſet ſail from *Barcelona* in *October* 1731, and arrived at *Leghorn* the 26th of that Month.

As ſoon as the Court of *Spain* received Intelligence that their *Forces* were ſafely landed, and that * *every Thing, relating to the Introduction of* Spaniſh *Garriſons in* Tuſcany *was finiſhed*; the *young Prince* was ſent after them by Land, as far as *Antibes*; for They choſe to let Him travel thro *France*, rather than accept of thoſe magnificent Accommodations, which had been provided for Him and his Retinue on Board our Squadron, at ſo great an Expence. His Highneſs arrived at † *Leghorn* the 27th of *Dec.* following, and was received there with all poſſible Marks of Joy and Reſpect; eſpecially by the *Engliſh Factory*, *who erected a triumphal Arch in Honour of the Day.* Soon after This, his Majeſty received a Letter from the Dutcheſs Dowager of *Parma*, Guardian to *Don Carlos*, wherein †† *ſhe acquaints his Majeſty with the due and happy Accompliſhment of* that Succeſſion, *deſiring his Majeſty's Acceptance of a* *† MEDAL *ſtruck upon this Occaſion, and expreſſing her Senſe of his Majeſty's Friendſhip to the* Royal, Infante Duke, *as well as to* Herſelf; *and of the great*

* See the *London Gazettes* for the Month of *Nov.* 1731.

† *London Gazette, Jan* 1ſt. 1731-2.

†† See the *publick Papers* of the ſame Date.

*† It was ſaid that *this Medal* contain'd the Effigies of *Don Carlos* on one Side, with this Inſcription; *Carolus I. Borbonius-Farneſius, novus Dux* PARMAE & PLACENTIAE; and on the Reverſe, a *royal Crown* upon a Carpet, with this Device; MOX VENIET.

great Share, that his Majesty hath had in this IMPORTANT EVENT.

About the same Time, Admiral *Wager* received a Present of the King of *Spain*'s Picture set with Diamonds, to a great Value, for his Services in that glorious Expedition.

Don Carlos being thus established in his new Dominions, to the Satisfaction of their *Catholick Majesties*, and at our Expence, the *ministerial Writers* began to raise their Crests again, and promised us all, that our Hearts could wish from the Court of *Spain*, in Return for such high Obligations.——But before I proceed to the Effects of these Transactions, I must make a few Remarks on another Article of the *Vienna Treaty*.

For as the *Emperor* consented to this Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, which He seem'd so resolutely determin'd to oppose with all his Might but a Year before; it must be concluded, that He likewise obtained some favourite Point for Himself; and That was *our Guaranty of the* PRAGMATICK SANCTION; the very Point, which was mark'd out and foretold by the *Country Writers* as the only Term, upon which We should be able to purchase the Accession of his *Imperial Majesty* to the Treaty of *Seville*. This was just hinted at before; but I must now beg Leave to cite the *Passage* at large, with the *Author's* Sentiments upon *such an Expedient*.

† " But it will be said, perhaps, that We are " brought into no Danger of a War with the *Em-* " *peror*; that our *wise Ministers* have a Reserve " still in their Power, and can make a Peace with " his *Imperial Majesty*, whenever They please; that " to effect it, nothing more will be necessary than " to

† *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 292.

" to give *our Guaranty* to the Diſpoſition, what-
" ever it be, which his Imperial Majeſty hath made,
" or ſhall make of the *Auſtrian Dominions.*

" Such an *Expedient* as This would, I doubt not,
" be ſoon paſs'd (if the immediate Danger of a
" *War* preſs'd upon us) by *Thoſe*, who think of
" nothing more than how to get over, by *annual*
" *Expedients*, the *annual Difficulties* They bring
" Themſelves under; without any Regard to the
" continual Charge and frequent Loſſes, which
" the Nation is obliged to ſupport, by their Ma-
" nagement, or to the dangerous Conſequences
" of their Meaſures. But Men, who think on
" wiſer and honeſter Principles, would look on
" *ſuch a Guaranty* as a Method of Cure very little
" preferable to the Diſeaſe it ſelf.

" His *Imperial Majeſty* hath indeed given *his*
" *Guaranty* to the Succeſſion of our Crown, eſta-
" bliſh'd in the preſent, Royal Family; but there
" would be no Parity between *ſuch a Guaranty* as
" This, and the *Guaranty of a Succeſſion*, the Na-
" ture of which may be known by the *Pragmatick*
" *Sanctions*, but the Deſcent of which into any
" *particular Family* cannot be foreſeen.

" Who could anſwer, in this Caſe, that We
" might not give *our Guaranty* even to the ag-
" grandizing of *Don Carlos*; which is an Event
" *our Politicians* have expreſs'd their Apprehen-
" ſions of in the ſtrongeſt Terms, although They
" ſeem at preſent a little better reconciled to it?

" Who could foreſee the numberleſs Miſchiefs,
" of which ſuch a Diſpoſition of the *Auſtrian*
" *Dominions* might be productive, if his *Imperial*
" *Majeſty* ſhould die without *Iſſue male?* What
" Claſhing of Intereſts might there not be, even in
" the *Imperial Family*, as well as in every Part of
" the *Empire?* To get clear of a War with *Spain*,

We

" We expoſe our ſelves to a War, which may " commence in *Italy*, and ſpread much farther. " By *the Expedient*, now ſuppoſed, We might get " clear of an immediate War in *Italy*; but We " ſhould ſtand in Danger of being involved, a lit- " tle ſooner, or a little later, in a War, which " may diſtract *Germany* as much, and laſt as long " as That of 1618, and kindle its Fires all over " *Europe*.

The *Author of the Enquiry* reaſon'd, upon the ſame Principles, againſt *our Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction*, about two Years before, and applauded his late Majeſty's Wiſdom for refuſing it, in the following Words. " Certainly, no one can " think but that it was wiſely and happily judg'd " to refuſe a *Guaranty*, which might have been at- " tended with ſo fatal Conſequences; for as the " *Emperor's* Children are now *Females* only; and " the Influence of that Succeſſion upon *Europe* muſt " depend upon the Marriages of *theſe Females*; " and as no one then knew to what *Princes* They " might be hereafter married; it was wiſe in his " Majeſty not to oblige Himſelf to ſupport a *Suc-* " *ceſſion*, which might poſſibly, by ſome *future* " *Marriages*, become formidable to the reſt of " *Europe*, and fatal in the End to *Britain* it ſelf.

This was the Language of the *Court*, and the Doctrine of the *Enquiry*, at the Beginning of the Year 1727, in order to juſtify the Treaty of *Hanover*, and the Meaſures, that had been taken againſt the Allies of *Vienna*. I muſt therefore beg Leave to recommend one Conſideration to the *Author of that memorable Treatiſe*; who ſeem'd to be very angry, about five Years ago, with an Obſervation, † *that He had been given up, in every material Article*,

† *Craftſman*, vol. 4. p. 85.

Article, *by* BOTH PARTIES, and complain'd of it as groundleſs. This Complaint, among other Reaſons, produced a * Reply from the *Gentleman*, who made the *Obſervation*; and it was generally thought that He ſupported it very fully, by an Induction of Particulars, as to the *main Points* then in Diſpute; I mean the ſeveral Articles of the *ſecret*, *offenſive Treaty of Vienna*, which was ſo ſtrongly aſſerted in the *Enquiry*; for it did not then enter into any Body's Imagination, that We ſhould ever conſent to the *Introduction of* SPANISH GARRISONS *into Italy*, or become *Guaranties of the* PRAGMATICK SANCTION. But ſince the *Viciſſitude of human Affairs*, the *Fluctuation of Power*, and the *Revolution of Politicks* have brought theſe Things to paſs, I leave the *Gentleman* to determine, in his own Breaſt, *whether He is not now effectually given up in* every material Article, *which He either aſſerted, or juſtify'd in that Book.* I am willing to believe Him a Man of *great Sincerity*, and that He was led into Error meerly through *Miſinformation*; but ſince his Book was ſet forth by Authority, as a Sort of *political Canon*, which the People were to receive for their *Rule of Faith*, and hath been made the Foundation of all our Diſputes, for ſeveral Years together, it certainly behoves Him to review it once more, and compare it with our *late Meaſures*, as becomes a *candid Writer* and a *Lover of Truth.*— But This is only by Way of Digreſſion. Let us now proceed to other Matters, according to the Method laid down.

It muſt be confeſs'd that *this Treaty* of *Vienna* prevented an *immediate War*, and ſerv'd to keep Things together for ſome Time; but it was far from eſtabliſhing a *firm* and *laſting Peace*; for, to ſpeak in the ſofteſt Terms, there hath been a remark-

* *Ib.* p. 259.

able Coldneſs between *Us* and *France* ever ſince; and the Preparations in the Ports of *Spain* for equipping *another Armament*, the very next Spring, ſeem'd to give our *Miniſters* ſuch an Alarm, that a *Fleet* was fitted out here likewiſe in a great Hurry, and rendezvouz'd at the *Nore*, where it continued for ſome Time, under the Command of Sir *George Walton*. This, I ſay, ſeem'd to intimate that our *Court* had ſome Jealouſy of the Deſign of the *Spaniards*; for as ſoon as certain Intelligence arrived that They were landed near *Oran*, the *Admiral* was ordered to ſtrike his Flag, and the Ships return'd to their Harbours.

Immediately after This, the *miniſterial Preſs* was delivered of another Pamphlet, intitled * *the natural Probability of a laſting Peace in* Europe; from whence it is neceſſary to quote a few Paſſages.

He begins with telling us that † "We enjoy at "preſent the *moſt perfect*, *univerſal* and *eſtabliſh'd* "*Tranquility*. We behold not only *Great Britain* "at Peace, and on the moſt amicable Terms with "*all her Neighbours*, but all her Neighbours are "at the ſame Time diſpoſed in the ſtrongeſt Manner to live *well with each other*. We are not "only happy in a good Underſtanding with *other* "*Nations*, but thoſe Nations likewiſe are without Quarrels and Diſputes *among Themſelves*; ſo "that as We have no Proſpect of War, or Contention, by *Differences of our own*; neither are "We likely to be drawn into Danger by the *Diſ*"*agreements*, the *Ruptures*, or *Commotions of others*.

This, one would think, was ſufficient in all Conſcience; but He explains our Happineſs more particularly in the next Paragraph.

"This moſt advantageous Situation, *ſays He*, "is

* Printed for *Peele*, in the Year 1732. † *Ib.* p. 2.

" is what We have very ſeldom ſeen, what We " hope will long continue, and what We conceive " to be ſecured by the *moſt effectual, the beſt con-* " *trived Means in the World.* We cannot look back " to any particular Period, within a long Courſe " of Time, when *Europe* was bleſt with *ſuch uni-* " *verſal Quiet*, and with ſuch reaſonable Hopes of " its *long extended Duration.* Almoſt every Peace, " that hath been made in *Europe*, ſince the Reſto- " ration of *Charles* 2d, ſeems to have been in its " Nature, as well as in its Conſequence, no better " than a *ſhort Ceſſation of Arms*; and whoever " looks into the *Treaties*, which were deſign'd to " compoſe the *Quarrels of Princes* then at Vari- " ance, may eaſily ſee their *Differences* far from " being *finiſhed*, and *thoſe unfiniſh'd Differences* " big with *new Calamities.* But We have now " the Happineſs to ſee the PLAN OF POWER ſo " well deſign'd, the *Limits* ſo well bounded, and " ſo ſtrongly fenc'd, the ſeveral Princes of *Europe* " ſo well ſatisfy'd with their *reſpective Conditions*, " ſo powerfully diſpoſed to *live peaceably within* " *Themſelves*, and ſo very far from being either " intereſted, or inclined to make *Encroachments on* " *their Neighbours*, that We may indulge all thoſe " Pleaſures, which good Minds are capable of " conceiving on ſo *agreeable a Proſpect*; ſince no " Seaſon ever beheld a *Peace more univerſal*, nor " did any Conjuncture of Affairs ever promiſe a " *Peace more eſtabliſh'd and laſting.*

Some Remarks upon *this Piece* were immediately publiſhed in the † *Craftſman*; particularly on the NEW PLAN OF POWER, ſo highly extoll'd in the foregoing Paragraph.

This Writer profeſs'd Himſelf ready to acknow-

† No. 317. *July* 29, 1732.

lege that " almoſt every Peace ſince the Reſtora-
" tion *(and eſpecially for* SEVERAL YEARS PAST)
" ſeems to have been in its Nature, as well as in
" its Conſequence, no better than a SHORT CES-
" SATION OF ARMS." He likewiſe confeſs'd,
" that the PLAN OF POWER in *Europe* was cer-
" tainly alter'd by two fundamental Articles of
" our *late Treaties*; *viz.* the Introduction of *Don*
" *Carlos* into *Italy*, and the Guaranty of the
" *Pragmatick Sanction*." But He was very far from agreeing with *this Reaſoner upon Probabilities*, that it had laid the Foundation of an *univerſal and eſtabliſh'd Peace*; ſince it was well known that the Court of *France* was ſo far from diſcovering any Diſpoſition to guaranty the *Pragmatick Sanction*, that it was undoubtedly their Intereſt to oppoſe it; that They had actually oppoſed it already, as far as They could do in the Way of *Negotiation*; and that, in all *Probability*, They would oppoſe it by *Force*, whenever the Contingency ſhould happen. — He likewiſe expreſs'd the ſame Apprehenſion from the new Settlement of *Don Carlos*, with Regard to the *Tranquility of Europe*, and ask'd the following remarkable Queſtions upon it. " May not the
" ITALIAN DOMINIONS furniſh a Bone of Con-
" tention between *Germany* and *Spain*, in Times
" to come, as *Flanders* hath already done between
" *France* and the *States General?* May not *theſe*
" *Pretenſions* prove the Means of UNITING *France*
" and *Spain*, and involve *Great Britain* in a War
" to ſupport her Engagements?

The *Court Author* beforementioned (That is, Mr. *Walſingham*) was pleaſed to give theſe Queſtions a Reply in his next † *Free Briton*, and treated it as a ridiculous Suppoſition, " that *France*
" and

† No. 140. *Aug.* 3. 1732.

" and *Spain* ſhould join in Arms againſt the *Prag-*
" *matick Sanction.* The Intereſts of *France* and
" *Spain (ſays He)* are ſo far incompatible, in this
" Affair, that the *Pope* and the *Turk* might as
" well be expected to join in a War for the ut-
" ter Subverſion of the *Proteſtant Religion.*

He adds, by Way of Interrogation, † " if
" the Crown of *Spain* had any Claims, any De-
" mands upon the *Emperor* in *Italy*, can it be
" thought that This would unite the *French* and
" *Spaniards* together? —— Would the Court of
" *France* think it worth their Trouble even to
" take away Power from the Houſe of *Auſtria*, if
" it were meerly to add to the *Spaniſh Power?*
" Or are not the *French* and *Spaniards* naturally
" as jealous of *each other*, as *either* of Them can
" be of the *Houſe of Auſtria?*——And can it then
" be thought that They will ever UNITE, when
" their Intereſts always muſt be different?

What an excellent Head muſt *this Man* have to reaſon upon *Probabilities*, and judge of *future Contingencies*, who ſeems altogether ignorant of *actual Events?* For it was viſible to every Body, of common Diſcernment, that an *Union* between *France* and *Spain* was very far advanced even at the Time, when He publiſhed this *Song of Triumph*; and, indeed, had been growing up ever ſince the Treaty of *Seville*, which naturally produced it, as the *Country Writers* juſtly obſerved, by diſſolving the Allyance between *Spain* and the *Emperor.* He likewiſe ſeems to have forgot a certain Obſervation of his old Acquaintance, ROGER MANLEY Eſq; ſome Years before, concerning the *Queen of Spain, viz.* * " that
" as ſhe is a Princeſs of SPIRIT and AMBITION,
" ſhe carried her Views *yet farther*, being very
" deſirous

† *Ib.* * *Britiſh Journal, Jan.* 4th, 1728-9.

" deſirous to make her SON *ſole Monarch* of LOM-
" BARDY." Now, if This is the true Character of her *Catholick Majeſty*, let me ask our *profound Politician*, whether paving the Way for *Don Carlos* ſo far as We have done, could poſſibly have any *natural Tendency* to check her *Ambition*; or whether ſhe could take a more *probable Method* of gratifying her *farther Views*, than by *uniting with* FRANCE, on a proper Opportunity?——But I am aſhamed to comment any farther on a *Piece*, which appeared abſurd enough of itſelf, when it was firſt publiſhed, and hath been lately ridicul'd in ſo * handſome a Manner. I ſhall therefore cloſe this Head with an Obſervation or two, which naturally reſult from the State of the Caſe.

The precedent Tranſactions are ſufficient to teach us how neceſſary it is for *Miniſters and Governors of Kingdoms*, which have any *main Intereſt* at Stake, or any *great Point* at Heart, to keep it conſtantly in View, and to purſue it with inflexible Reſolution. By theſe Means, We ſee, the Court of *Spain* hath at length effectuated the Succeſſion of *Don Carlos* to the *Tuſcan Dominions* through infinite Obſtacles; and, if We may believe the *miniſterial Writers*, againſt the Intereſts and Inclinations of all the Powers in *Europe*. By the ſame Means, his *Imperial Majeſty* hath, in a Manner, extorted *our Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction*, which his *late* and his *preſent Majeſty* thought fit to refuſe ſo long. I ſincerely wiſh that I had any Opportunity of congratulating my own Country on the ſame happy Iſſue of our Negotiations, with Reſpect to thoſe *eſſential Points*, about which We have been contending for ſo many Years, and at ſo much Expence; but though the ſame Aſſiduity hath, no Doubt, been employed, and the ſame

* *Fog's Journal, Dec.* 22, 1733.

ſame conſtant, invariable Regard hath been paid to *our Intereſts*, it does not yet appear that They have been crown'd with the ſame Succeſs. It is true, indeed, that his *Imperial Majeſty* hath at length conſented to aboliſh the *Oſtend Company*, and all Trade to the *Eaſt Indies* from the *Auſtrian Netherlands*; but This hath been confeſs'd, on *both Sides*, to be the *leaſt material Article*, with Regard to *Us*; and every Body knows that it might have been effectually ſuppreſs'd at firſt for a Trifle not worth mentioning, in Compariſon to thoſe immenſe Sums, which it hath ſince coſt us. Beſides, I obſerved before that the Buſtle We have made about *this Trade* hath ſet almoſt every Nation upon Schemes of the *ſame Kind*; and that even the *Emperor* Himſelf is now purſuing a Plan for carrying it on in ſome other Part of the World, not prohibited by *Treaty*. Our *principal Points* therefore are the undiſturb'd Poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar* and the Iſland of *Minorca*, the Freedom of *Commerce*, and Reparation to our *plunder'd Merchants*. As to the *firſt*, I cannot poſſibly conceive how *our Right to the Poſſeſſion of theſe Places* can be ſaid to be effectually aſcertain'd and ſecur'd, when the very *Treaty*, upon which the *Spaniards* ground their *Pretenſions* to them, is recall'd and confirm'd in all the *ſubſequent Treaties*, by which We are told They have renounc'd *thoſe Pretenſions*; eſpecially, when it is farther conſider'd that They have conſtantly refuſed to renounce Them *ſpecifically*, and have even given us the moſt ocular Demonſtration of their Intentions, by erecting *Forts* and other *military Works* to annoy our Garriſon, as well as our Ships in the Bay. The *Freedom of Commerce* and *Reparation to our Merchants* are ſo cloſely interwoven together, that they may be properly conſider'd under *one Head*; and what

hath

hath been done upon This? Why, the Time limited by the Treaty of *Seville*, for the Examination and Deciſion of *that Affair*, expired without any Thing being ſettled. Another Term of *three Years* was then agreed upon; above *one Year* of which is already lapſed, and I do not hear that the *Merchants* have yet received any Satisfaction. But as the *Commiſſaries*, on our Part, are now return'd, and the *Parliament* is juſt upon the Point of meeting, We ſhall ſoon know what They have done; and I heartily wiſh that a *certain Gentleman's* Prediction in the *Houſe of Commons*, when the Treaty of *Seville* came firſt under Deliberation there, may not be verify'd; *viz. that the Execution of* this Commiſſion *would coſt the Nation more than the* Merchants *would ever get by it.*—— If therefore We have not effectually inſiſted on either of theſe *great Points*, whilſt the *deareſt Intereſt* of *Spain* remain'd in Suſpence, and muſt have remain'd ſo without our Aſſiſtance; how can We expect to obtain them, when We have given *that Pledge* out of our own Hands, and *Spain* ſtands no longer in Need of Us?

But it will be ſaid, perhaps, (nay, it hath been ſaid in Effect already) that We could not purchaſe *Peace* at too dear a Rate, as our Circumſtances then ſtood; and that We had better yield to any Terms than plunge the Nation into a *War*. If This was our Caſe, I ſhould be glad to know why the ſame Conſiderations did not prevail long before; for if We had undertaken to effectuate the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with *Spaniſh* Garriſons into *Italy*, at the Congreſs of *Cambray*, inſtead of oppoſing it with ſo much Vigour, the Court of *Spain* would have had no Occaſion to throw Themſelves into the Arms of the *Emperor*; and if We had been happy enough, at the ſame Time,

Time, to discover that *the Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction* was only a Bugbear, that frighten'd us without any Reason, there is no Room to suppose that the *Emperor* would not have comply'd with the Demands of the *Spaniards*, upon *that Condition*, as readily as He hath done since. In this Case, I say, *Great Britain* would not only have saved an infinite Expence in sending out so many *naval Armaments* to all Parts of the World, keeping up *foreign Armies*, and paying *foreign Subsidies*, with all their *necessary Concomitants at home*; but might likewise have carried on her *Commerce* without Interruption, or such a continued Series of *Depredations*, as our *Merchants* have suffer'd for many Years past. Nay, if our *Ministers* had happen'd to make all these wise Discoveries at the Congress of *Soissons*, or even when the Treaty of *Seville* was in Agitation, We might have avoided some Part of these Expences and Calamities; for it is directly said in the *Answer to the Imperial Decree* against *that Treaty*, published at *Ratisbon*, and said to be written by the *French Minister*, * "that "the Court of *Vienna* did, in some Measure, put "the Allies of *Hanover* in the Way of the Nego- "tiation, which now fills Them with Indignation "and Resentment; and that nothing hath been "done, but what the *Emperor* was very ready to "do Himself, had CERTAIN CONDITIONS, essen- "tial to the Interests of HIS HOUSE, been com- "ply'd with.

But our greatest Misfortune is, that the very *Measures* We chose to take, for obtaining a *lasting Peace*, are likely to involve us in a *general War*; and, what is still worse, after We have spent so many *Millions of Money*, suffered so many grie-

* *Hist Register*, vol. 15. p. 185.

vous Losses in our *Trade*, and made such *large Concessions*, in order to avoid it. This is what the *Country Party* have long ago foretold, and I am heartily sorry to find their Predictions so nearly accomplish'd; for it appears very plainly, from the foregoing Deduction, to what Causes the present Commotions in *Europe* are really owing; I mean to the Treaty of *Seville*, which opened a Way for the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, and to the last Treaty of *Vienna*, which compleated the Union between *France* and *Spain*, as the *other* laid a Foundation for it, by separating *Spain* from the *Emperor*.

How ridiculous therefore is it to argue, as *some Men* do, that the present War in *Europe* was occasioned meerly by the accidental Death of the late King of *Poland*, which *no human Wisdom could foresee?* It may be said, indeed, that the Demise of *that Prince* was the immediate Occasion of the Flame's bursting out; but the combustible Matter was laid long before, and the least Spark was sufficient to set Fire to the Train. The Vacancy of the Throne of *Poland* happened to come first in the Way; but any other Accident in *Europe* would have had just the same Effect.

The Court of *Vienna* was so far from imputing the *present War* to the Death of *Augustus*, that They represented the * " *Polish Election* as an Handle " only for putting *those Designs* in Execution, " which *France* had meditated long before the " Throne of *Poland* became vacant.

Besides, it ought to be considered that although the particular Year, Month, or Day, on which King *Augustus* would die, could not be foreseen; yet it is well known that He was *above threescore Years of Age*, and in a *very infirm State of Health*.

No

* See the *Remarks on the Motives of the* French King's *Resolutions*.

No wiſe People therefore would care to pay for an *Annuity of Peace upon ſuch a Life*; and We ought, at leaſt, to have been ſecured againſt a *Contingency*, which could not be very far off, according to the ordinary Courſe of Nature. But *Contingencies* are Things, which *ſome Men* ſeem intirely to neglect. They conſider only the *preſent Time*; and if They can but make a Shift to put off the Evil *for a Day*, They ſeldom *take any Thought for the Morrow.*

I know it will be ſaid, (as it hath been ſaid before, upon other Occaſions) that † *the Judgment from the* EVENT *of Things meerly is not the Judgment of* REASON. I grant that it is not *meerly* ſo; eſpecially when We ſpeak of *fortuitous Events*, which *God* only can foreſee; though the *Court Party* have often founded their Triumphs upon *ſuch Accidents*; and I will venture to affirm that no Men were ever more lucky in *that Particular.* But the *Events* We ſpeak of, at preſent, are only ſuch as flow from *natural Cauſes*; in the Foreſight of which all *political Wiſdom* conſiſts. I believe the Gentlemen on the *Country Side* do not pretend to any *ſupernatural Light*, or *Gifts of Divination*; and yet That muſt be the Caſe, if all the *Events*, which They have foretold, are meerly *accidental.* If They had judg'd right upon *one* or *two Points* only, it might have been imputed to *Gueſs-work*, or *Chance*; but to be juſtified in their Opinion of publick Tranſactions, for ſeven or eight Years together, by the Conſequences of them, in almoſt every Particular, is certainly owing to ſomething more than a meer Run of *Luck*, and can proceed from nothing but a right Judgment of *Cauſes* and *Effects.*

† *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 25.

But it may be ſaid again, of what Uſe is it, at preſent, to tell us that *one Set of Gentlemen* had more Sagacity and Foreſight than *another?* The *Events* of our late Tranſactions are now viſible to every Body; the Nation is in Danger; and *what is to be done?* This, indeed, is a proper Queſtion; but the Anſwer is not ſo eaſy. Things ſeem to be brought to ſuch a Paſs, that I wiſh it may not puzzle the ableſt Heads in *England* to extricate us with Honour out of that Labyrinth of *Engagements*, in which We are unhappily involved.

We find ourſelves oblig'd, by ſeveral *Treaties*, to aſſiſt the *Emperor*, if He ſhould be attack'd; and it is ſaid that We have been already call'd upon to perform *theſe Engagements*.

By the Treaty of *Seville*, We are ty'd down, in the ſtrongeſt Manner, to ſecure *Don Carlos* in the Poſſeſſion of his *Italian Dominions for ever, againſt* ALL EVENTS. His *Catholick Majeſty* alludes very plainly to *this Engagement* in his late *complaiſant Memorial* to the King of *Great Britain*; where He acknowledges the *generous Part*, which his Majeſty hath acted, with Regard to *Don Carlos*.

And if it ſhould be true, as a Rumour flies about, that the Plan of Operations, which the *French* are now purſuing in *Italy*, was firſt chalk'd out by Us, in Caſe the *Emperor* ſhould not make good his Engagements to *Spain*; what Part can We poſſibly take in *theſe Diſputes*, without wounding our Honour, or betraying our Intereſt?

If it ſhould be likewiſe true, as I have heard it whiſper'd, that We promis'd *France* our Aſſiſtance, about *four Years ago*, to reſtore King *Staniſlaus* to the Throne of *Poland*, whenever *Auguſtus* ſhould dye, and that our *Miniſter* was even order'd to cooperate with the *French Miniſter* for that Purpoſe;

if

if This, I ſay, is true, and We ſhould have ſince given the *Emperor* any Encouragement to oppoſe the Election of *that Prince*, how are We to act upon the preſent Occaſion?

In ſhort, whichever Way We turn ourſelves, or whatever Side We take, if We take any, We ſhall not only involve our ſelves in a dangerous and expenſive War, but likewiſe incur the Reproach and Reſentment of *one Side*, or the *other*; ſince *both* of Them think Themſelves intitled to our Aſſiſtance.

If, to avoid theſe Difficulties, We chuſe a State of *abſolute Neutrality*, and leave the *oppoſite Powers* to diſpute their own Quarrel among Themſelves, the Conſequence may be fatal to *Europe*, and at length involve *Us* in the common Calamity.

The Queſtion therefore recurs, *what is to be done?—Or is any Thing to be done?*—Ought We to involve our ſelves in a *War*, in which We have *no particular Intereſt* concern'd? —— Or ſhall We ſit down in Quiet, and run the Hazard of ſeeing *Europe* become a Prey to the Arms of the *Conqueror?* —— For my Part, I cannot pretend to anſwer theſe Queſtions; and the preſent Situation of Affairs is ſurrounded with ſo many Difficulties on every Side, that I believe the wiſeſt Man in *England*, as I ſaid before, would be at a Loſs to judge what is moſt expedient in *ſuch a Criſis*. But one Thing ſeems to be very obvious; that *thoſe Perſons*, who have intangled us in the *preſent Difficulties*, are the moſt unlikely to work us out of them again; for how can *They* ſpeak to *foreign Courts* with that *Dignity* and *Authority*, which are neceſſary upon ſuch an Occaſion, when They have already dealt with every one of Them, and diſoblig'd Them all in their Turns? It is not therefore ſurprizing to hear *ſuch Men* crying out for Help,

Help, or to see Them ready to catch at any Hint, in order to justify their future Measures by the Sentiments and Characters of *Those*, whom They affect to despise.

When the Ship is really in Danger, all Hands must be at Work; and every Man will naturally endeavour, for his own Sake, to prevent her sinking; but, in the present Case, it is necessary to know our *whole Danger*, before any Gentleman will venture to give his Opinion upon it. There may be many more *secret Engagements*, or *Transactions*, than have yet come to our Knowledge; and how can any Body pretend to determine what Measures are most proper to be taken, till the *whole State of Affairs* is fully explain'd?

The *ministerial Writers* will cavil, perhaps, at this Conduct of the *Country Party*, and represent it as the Effect of a Resolution not to give the Government any Assistance, in Time of Danger, unless the Management of Affairs is put into their own Hands; but surely nothing can be more ridiculous than such an Imputation, in our *present Circumstances*. Men must be quite drunk, and even mad with the Lust of Power, to covet it on *such Terms*; and therefore if any of Them should be induced to undertake the publick Service, it ought to be imputed to their Zeal for his *Majesty's Honour*, and a generous Design of rescuing their *Country* out of its *present Difficulties*.—But I have done; and should not have made even these short Remarks, had I not accidentally met with a † *Pamphlet* just published; in which the *Author* discovers all the Marks of *Timidity*, under the Disguise of *blustering Language*, and exhibits to us the

† *A Letter to the* CRAFTSMEN, printed for *Roberts*.

the ridiculous Image of *natural Insolence* struggling with *Consciousness of Guilt*.

What I proposed was to state our Case, as I found it, with Regard to *foreign Affairs*; and to point out the several Gradations, by which We have been drawn into it. How We are to be extricated out of it, is beyond my Province, and must be referr'd to the Wisdom of *Parliament*.

I designed, indeed, to have added a State of our *domestick Affairs*, which have kept an equal Pace with *Those abroad*, as I am ready to prove by *Accounts* now lying before me; but these Sheets being already swell'd to a much larger Compass than I proposed at first, the *second Part* must be reserv'd for another Opportunity.

However, there is *one Point*, which requires immediate Consideration, under our *present, unhappy Circumstances*, and therefore must not be intirely pass'd over in Silence. I mean the NAVY DEBT; which is now calculated at near TWO MILLIONS, and hath been chiefly contracted since the Year 1722.

This Debt arises by the modern Practice of exceeding the annual Sum granted and appropriated by Parliament for the Service of the *Navy*, in order to keep up a larger Body of *Land Forces*, and at the same Time persuade unwary People that the *current Expences of the Year* are kept within due Bounds; whereas, in Truth, We are every Year running in Debt upon that Account; for the Service of the *Navy* being justly more popular than That of the *Army*, it is natural for *Ministers*, who have private Reasons for not raising the *whole Supplies* within the Year, to cloak all *Deficiencies* under the most *favourite Head*. But this Practice is of very mischievous Consequence to the Publick, and hath often been complain'd of as such in *Parliament*,

liament, as well as from the *Throne*; though hitherto without Redreſs.

At the latter End of Queen *Anne*'s Reign, the Parliament repreſented to her Majeſty, " that in- " creaſing the *annual Expences* beyond the Sup- " plies granted is an *illegal Practice*; a dangerous " Invaſion of the *Rights of Parliament*; and an " Attempt, which differs very little from *levying* " *Money without Conſent of Parliament*." —— I chuſe to quote theſe Paſſages from the *Repreſentation*, at that Time, becauſe They ſeem to have had ſo much Weight with a *certain honourable Gentleman*, that I find them tranſcribed into his own Obſervations on the *Navy Debt*, in the Year 1711.

At the opening of the Parliament in *Oct.* 1721, (ſoon after *this Gentleman* came into Power) the late King obſerved to Them, " that They could " not but be ſenſible of the ill Conſequences, which " ariſe from ſuch a large Debt unprovided for; " that as long as the *Navy* and *victualling Bills* " are at a very *high Diſcount*, they do not only " affect *all other publick Credit*, but increaſe the " Charge and Expence of the *current Service*."— He farther obſerves, " that *this Debt*, of all " others, is the moſt heavy and burthenſome.

The preſent great Debt of the *Navy* is therefore a Subject, which ſeems to require immediate Conſideration; and it is hoped that an effectual Stop will be put to ſuch Practices for the future.

Neither would it be altogether improper to make ſome Enquiries into the preſent State of our *Shipping*, the Condition of our *Stores*, and the Reaſons of that deplorable Deſertion of our *Seamen*, which, if not ſpeedily prevented, will render even our *Fleet* it ſelf of but little Uſe.

All

All Theſe are Points, which certainly deſerve the Attention of a *Britiſh Parliament*; eſpecially at a Time, when *Europe* is threaten'd with a general War, and our *Navy* at leaſt ought to be put under the beſt Regulations.

Before I conclude, let me juſt mention *another Practice*, of the moſt dangerous Conſequence to a *free State*; and That is the Method of granting Money without Limitation, Appropriation, or even ſo much as ſpecifying the Services to be perform'd. This is commonly, and indeed not improperly, called a *Vote of Credit*; ſince it repoſes an abſolute Confidence in the *King* and his *Miniſters* to act at Diſcretion, and make what Demands They pleaſe upon the People. I ſay, therefore, that it is a moſt dangerous Power, and may be made uſe of to deſtroy the very Being of *Parliaments*, by depoſiting the *Purſe of the Nation* in the Hands of the *Crown*, without any *Reſtriction*, or *Account*; for though *Miniſters* are always ready to promiſe *Accounts*, when They are pleading for ſuch *unlimited Grants*, yet they are conſtantly deny'd, when call'd for, as the *Journals of Parliament* abundantly teſtify; and This is one good Reaſon for ſuſpecting the Uſe of them.

On the other Hand, all the Arguments advanc'd in Favour of *theſe Grants*, ſuch as *ſudden Exigences*, *unforeſeen Accidents*, and *ſecret Service*, are meer Fallacies, to ſay no worſe of them, and may be urged with the ſame Force at all Times, and by every *Miniſter*, without any Diſcrimination.

As to the perſonal Character of the *Prince*, it hath nothing to do in this Caſe, nor ought it to be introduc'd upon ſuch an Occaſion; for every Body knows that Conceſſions to a *good King* are always made Precedents for the ſame Complaiſance to a *bad one*; and, indeed, who will preſume to

make the Diſtinction ? Beſides, the Character of the *beſt Prince*, that ever wore a Crown, ought not to be put in Competition with the *Privilege of Parliament*, and the *Liberties of a whole People.*

But if *Votes of Credit* are dangerous at all Times, They are peculiarly ſo juſt before a GENERAL ELECTION, when They may be employ'd to corrupt the *People* with their own Money, and deſtroy the Freedom of *that Houſe*, from whence They receive their Force.

Whoever reads the Memoirs of *Philip de Commines*, will ſee that the Subjects of *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy* loſt their Liberties by a *Power of the ſame Nature*, which that Prince artfully gain'd, under Pretence of keeping Himſelf always prepared againſt any ſudden Surprizes from his Neighbour the King of *France*. And one great Blow was given to the Liberties of *France* it ſelf, by the *like Conceſſions* to *Lewis* the Eleventh.

But the moſt remarkable Inſtance of the bad Conſequences of ſuch *extraordinary Grants* is recorded by Dr. *Geddes* ; who tells us that † *Henry* 2d, King of *Caſtile*, being reſolved on a War with the *Mooriſh* King of *Granada*, in the Year 1406, demanded a large Supply of the *Cortes* for carrying it on ; but the *Cortes*, judging the Sum too great for the People to pay, abſolutely refuſed to grant more than *one Third* of what the *King* demanded ; and when no Importunities could prevail upon Them to alter their Reſolution, the *King* gave his Aſſent to the Bill, which They had paſs'd for that Purpoſe ; " *but at the ſame Time* " *deſired that in Caſe the* Sum, *which They had* " *given, ſhould be found not to be ſufficient, They* " *would impower Him, without aſſembling the* Cortes, " *which*

† *Geddes's Tracts*, vol. 1. p. 331.

" *which would require Time, to raiſe Money upon* " *the Subject, to ſupply that Deficiency.*

Dr. *Geddes* obſerves " that although the giv- " ing the King *ſuch a Power* was fiercely oppoſed " by a great many *Procurators* as a Thing, that " ſtruck at the very Root of the Authority of a " *Cortes*, it was carryed by a *Majority*; and tho' " it was granted only for a *Year*, yet That was " enough to create *ſuch a Precedent*, as would " encourage their *future Kings* to deſire to have " the *ſame Power*, and to take it very ill, if it " were deny'd Them; and by ſuch WEAK, or " CORRUPT CONCESSIONS as Theſe it was, that " the *Spaniſh Cortes*'s came to loſe all their Au- " thority.

ERRATUM.

Page 35, for *Maſter-piece of Politicks*, read *Maſter-ſtring, which They had touch'd with Succeſs.*

FINIS.

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